Category: Military related

Among the many controversial operations launched during the “Second World War” the invasion of Italy is among the most debated. While Winston Churchill touted the Mediterranean as the “soft underbelly of Europe” the Italian campaign ultimately cost the allies more casualties than the Germans for what were arguably few obvious results. However, the much maligned Italian campaign was probably the best the Western allies could have done in 1943 and produced more benefits than has generally been recognized.

It is difficult to articulate what the allies could have done in the summer of 1943 that would have done more to damage the Axis war effort than invading Italy. The supposedly obvious answer would be a cross channel invasion of France that would have taken off pressure from Soviet forces fighting on the Eastern front and shortened the length of the war. While supporters of this view usually cite the fact that Germany had fewer divisions in France in the summer of 1943 than when the allies actually invaded in 1944, they ignore more important considerations.

These considerations include that the allies had only just gained the advantage in the “Battle of the Atlantic,” during the summer of 1943 which was necessary to keep Britain in the war, and build up sufficient U.S. forces in Europe, let alone launch such an ambitious invasion. In fact, the turning point for the allies in the Atlantic came only in May following a disastrous period where the Germans had been sinking ships at a faster rate than at any other time in the war. May was also the month the considerable German and Italian forces in North Africa were forced to surrender and it would arguably have been difficult, if not impossible, to transport significant forces from the Mediterranean to Britain and launch an invasion of France in the summer of 1943 as the allies were just starting to recover from the shipping losses of the previous five months.

Additionally, the allies had yet to gain air supremacy over France, in order to dominate the air space over the invasion area and interdict enemy forces trying to reinforce the German army in Normandy. While the allies certainly had air superiority (as in they had more warplanes than the Germans) they did not have aerial supremacy which meant they could fly anywhere, or bomb anything, at will. For example, while the Germans always had aerial superiority over the R.A.F. during the “Battle of Britain,” they never wore down the R.A.F. to achieve air supremacy to allow them to mount an invasion of Britain. While it is plausible the allies may have had enough planes to cover an invasion of France in 1943 it would have been in the face of a still relatively strong Luftwaffe. This means that the allies would have been forced to spend much more effort defending the landings, and escorting their bombers, and less emphasis on ground support and interdiction, both of which were crucial in the “Battle of Normandy.” Thanks to the allied aerial supremacy in 1944 they could accomplish all these tasks rather simply, but it would have been extremely difficult in 1943.

It should be kept in mind that the U.S. bombing offensive against Germany was ultimately unsuccessful in 1943 and therefore would not have been very effective during the summer at destroying German communications such as railroads, marshaling yards, tunnels and bridges that did much to isolate the German army in Normandy from sufficient reinforcements the following year. Only the introduction of fuel tanks and better aircraft gave the U.S. air force the edge over the Luftwaffe to wear it down in the spring of 1944.

Add this to the facts that the allies did not have overwhelming forces in England to land in Normandy, the shortage of landing craft in the European theatre (which was barely addressed in time in 1944), and that the allies did not even have an agreed upon invasion plan until late 1943, it is hard to see how a cross channel invasion in 1943 would have succeeded. There is also the point that the allies had not sufficiently mastered amphibious warfare by the summer of 1943 as seen by the near disasters at Anzio and Tarawa that occurred after that period. Pundits who cite the fact that the Allies landed more troops the first day on Sicily than Normandy conveniently ignore that there were no serious fortifications on the southern Sicilian coast and that the landings were virtually unopposed. Even when all these conditions had been rectified in the summer of 1944 the invasion of Normandy could arguably have failed, or at least been much more bloody, had the Germans not have been so thoroughly deceived by the massive disinformation campaign launched by the allies that convinced them to concentrate most of their forces in France around Calais instead of Normandy.

Once a cross channel invasion in 1943 is ruled out there was not much for the Western allies to choose from. An invasion of Norway would have been both logistically difficult and offered few strategic rewards. An invasion of Greece would have arguably been the same unless it could have enticed Turkey to enter the war much earlier, though there is little reason to expect it would have (and even then Turkish belligerence would hardly have proven to be decisive in any case). Finally, an invasion of Corsica, Sardinia, and/or Southern France would have likely been unpractical due to the considerations listed above, as well as the lack of sufficient port facilities in the Western Mediterranean to support such endeavors.

Therefore, in the summer of 1943 all the allies could do towards causing significant damage to the Axis war effort was to mount an invasion of Sicily and Italy. While such operations had little prospect of defeating the German army decisively in 1943, or to seriously appease the Russians, who were fighting the overwhelming bulk of the German forces, it offered the allies significant strategic advantages.

Firstly, it offered the chance of knocking Italy out of the war. While “World War 2” literature is generally uncharitable regarding the performance of the Italian armed forces, the fact remains that Italy was Germany’s most important ally in Europe and had significant amounts of troops and naval assets to oppose the allies. Perhaps most threatening to the allies was her sizable navy and geographic position that cut Britain’s tradition trade route to the Far East via the Mediterranean. The British estimated that securing the Mediterranean would drastically shorten their sea lines of communication and save the allies a million tons of shipping a year (not a bad consideration as the allies were on the brink of losing the “Battle of the Atlantic” during early 1943).

There were a considerable amount of Italian divisions that either fought against the Western allies and Russians, or served as garrisons in Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece and France. While admittedly they did not always fight well, they at least freed up many German divisions to fight elsewhere. Knocking Italy out of the war had the potential to force the Germans to send a significant amount of divisions there, usually from the Russian front, as well as to replace the Italian forces garrisoned across Europe. The number of troops the Germans had to disarm and replace was not insignificant, it involved nearly 250,000 in the Aegean and Greece, 150,000 in Yugoslavia, and 600,000 in Italy. A week after the Germans had initiated operation “Achse” to forcibly disarm the Italians after Italy’s surrender to the allies, the German high command estimated it had completely disarmed 56 Italian divisions, and partially disarmed another 29. To suggest that eliminating nearly 1,000,000 soldiers from the enemy’s order of battle in wartime (even if they were of questionable quality) would not produce positive strategic results would be absurd.

Besides these advantages there were other benefits that were produced by the Italian campaign. While the Russians were not pleased that the Western allies decided to attack a subsidiary objective instead of invading France, it was the best they could do and arguably did enough to steer Stalin away from being serious about exploring a separate peace with Hitler in 1943. Many scholars, pundits and academics often forget that Russia did most of the fighting in Europe during World War 2 and that they, not the Western allies, broke the back of the German army. They seem to forget that while the British and Americans were invading tiny Sicily in 1943 that the German army was far from defeated and was launching the greatest battle in “World War 2” around the Kursk salient on the Eastern front. It was only after this intensely contested battle (in which the Russians lost far more men and tanks than the Germans) had been won by the Soviets that the initiative really passed to the allies. Thus, while the battle in Italy may not have impressed the Russians, it at least convinced them that the Western allies were doing something significant to fight the Germans.

Also, the numerous amphibious assaults launched during the Italian campaign (Sicily, Salerno and Anzio) gave the allies considerable experience in amphibious warfare. Keeping in mind the poor showing at Dieppe in 1942, the slaughter the Americans experienced at Tarawa in late 1943, and even the near disaster at Omaha beach on D-Day, the allies seemed to have needed all the experience in combined operations they could get. It is simply too optimistic to believe that the allies could have successfully landed in France in 1943 considering their less than impressive record regarding amphibious assaults, let alone all the factors mentioned above. Additionally, much like the Desert campaign, it gave the allies valuable experience in fighting the German army before the main contest, in Normandy, the following year. While this seems like a rationalization, it should be noted that besides the fighting in Algeria and Tunisia following the Torch operation, the Americans had no other combat experience fighting the German army, and the potential consequences of a complete reversal in Italy were a lot less grievous than if the allies had failed invading France.

However, despite the advantages the invasion of Italy gave the allies there is arguably much to criticize regarding the Italian campaign. While it made sense to invade Italy from a political and strategic point of view, the allies could not have asked for a worse battlefield from a tactical point of view. With its narrow length, mountain terrain, and lack of open areas, Italy was arguably a defender’s paradise. Despite the overwhelming numerical, material, and firepower advantages of the allies, the Italian campaign was epitomized by attrition and produced few moments of spectacular military excellence.

Put bluntly, the Italian campaign was useful in appeasing the Russians, diverting German forces from vital fronts, giving the allies valuable experience, but not as a means of severely degrading German military power. This was all that was ever realistically expected of it. Despite Churchill and other British strategists’ wishes to fight a major war in the Mediterranean, there was never any chance of it happening considering the Americans, who were always unequivocally committed to invading France, were destined to have the final say in strategy due to their unquestionable material supremacy vis a vis the British.

However, if there were sound strategic and political reasons to invade Italy, the execution of the campaign itself was controversial to put it mildly. It is one thing to suggest the topography of Italy is generally not suitable for maneuver warfare (which is true), but quite another to imply that it was the route of all the setbacks during the Italian campaign. Napoleon’s decisive campaigns in Italy, the German victory of Caporetto during “World War 1” and Germany’s swift conquest of Yugoslavia and Greece in 1941 show that well trained, well equipped and sufficiently motivated forces can accomplish significant offensive gains in mountain terrain. This is not to suggest that the allies could have decisively defeated the German army in Italy in “World War 2” but that they arguably could have conducted the Italian campaign with more skill.

Even though the allies ultimately triumphed in Italy, the campaign itself, much like the North African venture, showed that the allies had much to learn when fighting the German army. The snail’s pace in the Sicily operation, the near disaster at Salerno, the “beached whale” as Churchill put it, at Anzio, and the brutal slogging matches at Monte Casino, were catalogued by what were arguably poor operational and tactical decisions by the Western allies. And perhaps the one chance of inflicting a serious defeat on the German army in Italy was wasted when General Mark Clark decided to take Rome for the sake of glory instead of surrounding a good part of the German 10th Army.

While allowances such as Italy’s horrible topography, the undoubted tactical superiority of German forces over the allies, and least of all hindsight, do much to explain the relatively unexceptional military results shown by the allies advancing up the Italian peninsula, there is little doubt that the execution of the Italian campaign did not mirror the considerable strategic and political advantages it ultimately conferred towards the allied war effort. Yet, much like the overly criticized British army during the “First World War,” the allies in Italy ultimately won the military contest and deserve respect rather than condemnation.

Indeed, the Axis leadership was hardly blameless regarding their performance regarding its operations in the Mediterranean theatre of operations. The failure to take Malta and secure Rommel’s lines of communication in Libya, the decision to reinforce a doomed battle in Tunisia, and the practice of contesting every inch of Italian soil instead of initiating sensible withdrawals when necessary, provide sufficient evidence that on the strategic level at least the Germans did not live up to their Clausewitzian reputation. In fact, whereas the allies were arguably correct in their strategic appraisal of the Mediterranean theatre of war, but not as proficient regarding their tactical means to accomplish their objectives, the Germans fought the Italian campaign with considerable tactical skill at the expense of critical strategic considerations.

Simply put, the Germans could have defended Italy with far less resources (which were needed more critically in Russia or Western Europe), had they decided to enact a strategy of gradual withdrawal up the boot of Italy, instead of fighting linear defensive battles across southern and middle Italy. While such battles caused severe allied casualties, they also tied down significant amounts of German forces that could have been used elsewhere. Likewise, such stationary defense allowed the allies to deploy their unmatchable superiority in numbers and firepower, that no matter how long or how costly, would eventually triumph over the Germans. In other words the Germans could easily have sacrificed space for time in Italy and reinforced more important fronts instead of subjecting their forces to brutal attritional slogs that they had no chance of winning. Given the Russian and Western allies’ vastly superior resources and manpower, the Italian campaign definitely provided a bigger inconvenience to the Germans than it did to their enemies.

The invasion of Italy was the best option available to the Western allies in 1943 and did much to further the allied war effort. The allies did not have the resources, or the experience, to invade France and inflict a decisive defeat upon the German armed forces in 1943. The campaign knocked Italy out of the war, forced the Germans to send many divisions needed more critically elsewhere to the Italian peninsula, and to replace Italian garrisons across Europe. Doing so took significant pressure off the Russians on the Eastern front, increased the Western allies proficiency at mounting amphibious assaults and gave them (especially the Americans) vital experience fighting the German army. While the Italian campaign lacked the glamour of the Normandy invasion or the mind boggling scale of the titanic struggle on the Eastern front, it was a necessary, if inglorious, undertaking.

Bibliography

Beevor, Antony. The Second World War. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2012.

Bishop, Chris. German Campaigns of World War 2. London: Grange Books, 2001.

Churchill, Winston. The Second World War: Closing the Ring. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951.

Lewis, Jon. The Mammoth Book of Battles. London: Robinson Publishing, 2000.

Macksey, Kenneth. From Triumph to Disaster. London: Greenhill Books, 1996.

Warner, Philip. World War Two. London: Cassell, 2002.

Article from the “Comando Supremo, Italy at War”: The Second World War in Italy: was it worth it? The folly and brutality of war, from Sicily to the Po Valley by Michael Howard, June 25, 2008. http://www.comandosupremo.com/forums/topic/5783-michael-howard-on-italian-campaign-was-it-worth-it/

Wikipedia article on “Operation Achse”: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Achse [August, 2012]

Russia is not known for brilliant generalship or first class armies.  Carl Von Clausewitz once labeled the Russian Army as “probably the least advanced” in Europe.  Yet historically, while most of Europe has fallen to countries such as France and Germany, Russia has not only survived, but even destroyed vast armies set forth to conquer her.  How could more advanced countries with better-led and equipped armies fail to stop such juggernauts as La Grande Armée or the Wermarcht, while a nation as backward as Russia with ill-trained and disorganized forces destroy them?  It is because the Russian Army did not really defeat them, the vastness of Russia itself did.  An effective way of defeating a significantly stronger enemy is luring it into the interior of one’s country.

Despite military rhetoric, there are situations in warfare when standing one’s ground and fighting the enemy is unwarranted and foolish.  Hitler’s decision to forbid the German 6th Army from retreating from Stalingrad and Custer’s Last Stand come to mind.  As Sun Tzu once remarked, “one must know when to fight, and when not to fight.”  Sometimes the only sensible option open to a commander is to retreat.  After all an orderly retreat is preferable to the complete destruction of one’s force.  If an army stood its ground and was destroyed, the best that could be hoped for would be to hurt the enemy sufficiently to force it to temporarily halt, which is extremely unlikely.  However, when an army retreats it can fall back on its own lines of communication while luring the enemy away from its Base of Operations.

In such a case, the advantage usually lies with the defender.  While the defender usually grows stronger by falling back and procuring more reinforcements and supplies, the attacker grows weaker from leaving troops behind to secure his communications, as well as to garrison fortresses and cities.  Additionally, the more the enemy advances, the further he will be from his Base of Operations and his Lines of Communication will be continuously stretched.  Eventually he will suffer from shortages and all they entail.  Therefore the attacker will likely suffer more casualties from sickness and noncombat injuries than the defender, and with fewer reinforcements and supplies, more equipment will likely be written off as well.  Also, the attacker will probably have to deal with partisans, who will harass them whenever they can.  Finally, as Clausewitz constantly reminds us “the defensive form of warfare is intrinsically stronger than the offensive,” which means more likely than not, the attacker will have higher combat injuries and deaths than the defender.  When all these factors are taken into account, it is not difficult to see how at the end of a long advance into the heart of an alien country, the attacker, who likely held a comfortable superiority at the beginning, will in many cases be significantly weaker than the defender.

Once the invader has reached the culminating point of his offensive and failed to destroy his adversary, he will be in a very vulnerable position indeed.  He will probably be weaker than the defender and have vulnerable Lines of Communication.  Meanwhile the defender, assuming he has retreated in an orderly fashion and has suffered less casualties and hardships and has been constantly reinforced with men and supplies, will be in a very advantageous position.  Now would be the obvious time for him to counterattack.

With his new-found superiority, the defender’s success in a counterattack is almost guaranteed.  However, if in spite of all the advantages the defender failed to score a significant victory, imagine what would have been the result against the enemy at the beginning of the campaign when the defender had none of the advantages, yet decided to fight instead of retreating?  However, it is more likely that the invader will lose the engagement and have to retreat.  How much men and equipment he will lose and how far he will have to retreat will of course depend on the circumstances.

Either way, as Clausewitz points out “There is an enormous difference between losing a battle on one’s frontier and losing it in the very heart of enemy territory.”  While losing a battle on the frontier is bad enough, at least you can retreat into friendly territory where you will have easy access to reinforcements and supplies.  However, losing a battle deep inside enemy territory is much more dangerous.  Not only would it be harder to procure reinforcements and supplies, but you would also be far away from your base of operations, the populace would probably be against you, and the subsequent retreat would be much more painful than had it been made on the frontier.  Of course, while it goes without saying that if the attacker managed to decisively defeat the defender in the heartland of his own country he would probably win the war the whole premise of this paper implies that the best chance of defeating a vastly superior invading army is to let it wear itself down until its superiority wanes.

While luring a superior enemy into your heartland can be a very successful strategy, there is no guarantee that it will work.  As Winston Churchill once told Field Marshal Wavell, “no one can guarantee success in war, but only deserve it.”  Like any situation in warfare, the circumstances and the resources one has at their disposal will probably dictate what course of action is taken more so than vague and often contradicting rules written down by theorists.  Therefore it is necessary to look at some limiting factors which could either limit the effectiveness of the strategy, or render it impractical.

Firstly, it is obvious that a small country could never adopt such a strategy.  The whole country would probably be occupied and its army would no longer have the means left to sustain it.  Even if the enemy did not occupy the whole country, it is probable that he would not suffer enough hardships to wear him down to give the defender a chance of defeating him, assuming that was the defender’s goal.

Secondly, the strategy would also be ineffective if the retreating army had to leave behind areas which were vital to its nation’s continuation of the war.  Such areas would include a capital city, vital industries, or a significant amount of one’s population.  Some good examples would be Paris to the French and the Ruhr to the Germans.  Not only is Paris the capital of France, but it also has a big proportion of France’s population, and at least during both world wars, most of its war production.  The Napoleonic Wars, the Franco-Prussian War and World War 2 demonstrate that the fall of Paris inevitably leads to the fall of France.  As for Germany, while the Ruhr does not house the German capital, or a significant portion of the country’s population, it was undoubtedly the most important industrial area in Germany during both world wars as well.  Once the allies seized it in early 1945 Germany simply lacked the potential to significantly produce weapons from then on, not that it would have made much of a difference by then anyway.

Finally, the strategy might not work if a nation’s populace was not loyal.  In a grave situation where your army must evacuate large portions of your country, it is vital that the people are on your side.  A retreat never bodes well for public opinion, as it implies that the war is going badly.  If the populace was dissatisfied with their leaders and sensed that their demise was inevitable, they would certainly question their legitimacy to rule.  For example, one of the principle reasons Marshal Kutuzov fought Napoleon against his better judgment at Borodino was that the Russian people were angry the Russian army kept retreating instead of fighting the French.  Also, during the Second Punic War, the Roman peoples’ dismay at the delaying tactics used by Fabius Maximus Cunctator to buy time for the Republic against Hannibal’s forces eventually led to the slaughter of perhaps 50,000 Roman soldiers at Cannae.  It is bad enough fighting another country without having to constantly appease public opinion.

Therefore, there are at least three prerequisites for a country to be able to adopt the strategy in question.  1)  The country must be fairly large, or at least big in relation to the enemy’s nation.  2)  The Army can retreat far enough to wear down the enemy without sacrificing areas which are necessary to continue the war.  3)  The populace must remain loyal.

While the conditions above have to be available in order to enact the strategy, other conditions are necessary to ensure that the strategy is implemented effectively.  After all, it is not simply a matter of retreating and assuming the enemy will just waste away.

To begin with, a retreat does not have to be a passive and disorderly affair.  It can be calculated and aggressive.  Obviously a retreat by an undefeated and organized force is much different than a retreat by an army that has just been routed in battle.  The former can inflict much damage on the pursuer, while the latter would be lucky to avoid losing the war.  That is why it is better to retreat than to fight a battle you have little hope of winning.  The retreating army controls the terrain and if he is skilful he can set up traps and ambushes.  As Frederick the Great showed many times during the 7 Years’ War, it is possible for the defender to be more aggressive than the attacker.

Therefore, it is vital that the rearguard of the retreating army inflict as much damage as possible without risking open battle.  A strong and active rearguard can make the difference between the invader surging arrogantly ahead in contempt of his enemy, or cautiously pursuing him out of fear or respect.  In the case of the latter, the invader would advance slowly and buy the defender more time.

It is not only vital to be aggressive while you are retreating in the face of a superior enemy, it is just as important to be aggressive once the enemy has reached the culminating point of his offensive.  If one managed to defeat the enemy in battle and the enemy retreated, the only plausible course of action would be a forceful pursuit.  This is necessary, for as Clausewitz noted “it is usually only then that the trophies tend to be taken which will embody the victory.” In other words, it is during the pursuit, and not the battle itself, that the enemy usually disintegrates.  This is when the winner will really amass the prisoners and equipment that represent victory.  While both sides usually fight hard and brave during the battle itself, once it has been decided the victor will likely be emboldened while the loser will probably lose faith and start to collapse.  However, if the loser is not pursued vigorously he can often regain order in a relatively short amount of time.  That is why it is absolutely necessary to pursue the enemy as fast and as strong as possible.  It is the only way to reap all the benefits from the battle, as well as routing the enemy.

Another crucial condition for the successful execution of the strategy in question is enacting a scorched earth policy.  Put simply, a scorched earth policy involves destroying or removing anything that could help the enemy during his advance.  Whatever resources and supplies that can be saved are withdrawn when the army retreats, and whatever remains is destroyed.  Cities are evacuated, and along with crops, they are usually burned.  Wells and lakes may be poisoned, and what is left of the livestock will be butchered.  Munitions and supplies should be destroyed before they fall into the enemy’s hands.  Roads can be damaged and bridges should be blown up.  If there is a case in war where there is a fine line between military necessity and barbarism, it is not here.

Scorched earth is very costly to any nation that implements it.  The populations of the abandoned cities become refugees, valuable crops and resources are destroyed, and infrastructure is severely damaged.  Not only that, but the people become embittered.  Even if they would not rebel, the pressure they would put on the government would be considerable.  They would question the strength and will of both the government and the army.  They would wonder why their soldiers were retreating before the enemy instead of standing their ground and protecting the nation.

Given their plight, it would be hard not to sympathize with their view.  However, given their situation they would not see the necessity of the decisions made by those in charge.  They probably would not realize, or care, that their army would be no match for the enemy’s, nor that to defeat the opposing army it would be necessary to first wear it down, and that scorched earth would be a very important means to that end.  While it is easy to sympathize with civilians who are innocent and should never have to deal with the harsh realities of war, such emotions should not obstruct what has to be done in order to defeat the enemy.

This leads to the final condition that makes withdrawing into the interior of the country a viable and effective strategy.  The Government and the Army, or more specifically the Head of State and the Field Commander must have the courage, the resolution and above all the stubbornness to adopt this strategy and see it through to the end.  Countless politicians, soldiers and civilians will criticize the plan and try to derail it every time something goes wrong.  The resulting pressures coupled with such enormous responsibility can easily push any leader to change the plan.  Therefore, it is up to those in charge to ignore all criticism, stomach every setback, inspire confidence where needed, and to stick to the plan no matter what.

When Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812 he led an army that had conquered nearly all of Europe and numbered more than half a million men.  Not only did he vastly outnumber his opponent, but in general his troops were of superior quality as well.  However, the more he advanced and suffered from casualties, shortages and disease, the more the Russians retreated and gained more reinforcements and supplies.  Although Napoleon eventually defeated the Russians in the Battle of Borodino and took Moscow, the Russian Army managed to recover and Napoleon’s strength had been so abated that he had little choice but to halt his advance at Moscow.  Soon afterwards he was forced to retreat, during winter, and in the debacle that followed only a small shadow of La Grande Armée eventually crossed the Berezina River back to safety.

Ironically the Russians had not planned to retreat, or at least to withdraw as far as they did, but their involuntary withdrawal into the interior of their country can be seen as a near perfect example of how to implement the strategy in question.

Luring a superior army into the interior of one’s country can be a very effective strategy during wartime.  A retreating army can get more reinforcements and supplies by falling back on its lines of communication while an attacking army usually gets weaker due to severe casualties, having to garrison cities and forts and the continuous stretching of its communications.  In order to enact such a strategy one’s country must be relatively big, can afford to sacrifice a considerable amount of its territory, and its populace must remain loyal.  To make this strategy work one would need an aggressive vanguard, adopt a scorched earth policy, and firm resolution by the country’s leaders to ignore every hardship and see the strategy through to the end.  In the case of a relatively weak, but big, country threatened by a relatively small, but strong, country, this strategy is often the only realistic option.

Bibliography
Churchill, Winston.  The Second World War:  Their Finest Hour.  Boston:  Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985.
Clausewitz, Carl Von.  On War.  New York:  Everyman’s Library, 1993.
Clausewitz, Carl Von.  The Campaign of 1812 in Russia.  Washington D.C:  Da Capo Press, 1995.
Goldsworthy, Adrian.  The Fall of Carthage.  London:  Cassell, 2004.
Marston, Daniel.  The Seven Years’ War.  Oxford:  Osprey Publishing, 2001.
Rothenberg, Gunther.  The Napoleonic Wars.  London:  Cassell, 1999.
Tzu, Sun.  The Art of War.  Boston:  Shambhala Publishing, 1991.
Warner, Philip.  World War Two:  The Untold Story.  London:  Cassell, 2002.