Why the Treaty of Versailles was not Responsible for the Outbreak of World War 2

“One day, President Roosevelt told me that he was asking publicly for suggestions about what the war should be called. I said at once, ‘The Unnecessary War.’ There never was a war more easy to stop than that which has just wrecked what was left of the world from the previous struggle.”

-Winston Churchill

There is probably no other peace treaty in history that has been as vilified as the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 that ended World War 1. While the great political thinker Machiavelli suggested that defeated “people should either be caressed or crushed” the Versailles Treaty seemingly got the worst of both worlds by humiliating Germany but not weakening her enough that she could not rebuild and seek revenge. Certainly a case can be made that the treaty itself had considerable flaws and helped build resentment and anger that contributed to events and policies that led to World War 2, but that does not mean it was directly responsible for, or even mostly responsible, for the outbreak of war in 1939. Between 1919 and 1939 were twenty tumultuous years that saw disastrous events, flawed policies and miscalculations by nations, missed opportunities and countless other factors which ultimately resulted in a Second World War breaking out in 1939. Hitler’s rise to power was not inevitable, Britain, France, America and Russia made mistakes, and had many opportunities to prevent Germany from developing a strong military, and countless decisions and events from 1919 and 1939 influenced the unlikely outbreak of hostilities in 1939 which Winston Churchill referred to as “The Unnecessary War.” The Versailles Treaty led to circumstances that helped lead to war in 1939, but by itself was not among one of the major reasons that started World War 2.

With hindsight it is generally believed that the Treaty of Versailles was unnecessarily harsh to Germany but this is debatable depending if one accepts the view that World War 1 was mostly due to German aggression. There is question as to whether or not Germany deliberately took advantage of the July Crisis in 1914 to launch a preemptive war against France and Russia due to her real or imagined fears of being encircled by hostile powers; or if she stumbled into war due to miscalculations and carelessly promising unconditional support to Austria-Hungary, which started the countdown to war by being inflexible towards Serbia. What is not debatable is that as the war continued German war aims became increasingly grandiose, aggressive and ultimately sought nothing less than the de facto domination of Europe. As was seen by the terms the Germans had in mind for Belgium and France, (reducing the former to a vassal state and effectively neutering the latter), along with the exceedingly harsh treaty she inflicted upon Russia in 1918 there can be no question that a potential German victory in the war would have seen a far less generous settlement for the Entente Powers.

Whereas the Versailles Treaty in 1919 spared German independence and allowed her to keep most of her industry, territory and resources (losing only 25,000 square miles, 7 million people and none of the vital Ruhr industrial region) the German treaty inflicted upon Russia (the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918) stripped the latter of over 1 million square miles including Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, part of Belorussia, the Ukraine, and even much of the Caucasus. This territory included over 55 million people (roughly 1/3rd of the Russian Empire’s population) as well as the majority of Russia’s industry, one third of her arable land, the vast majority of her coal fields and 1/4 of her railroads. Thus, unlike the Treaty of Versailles that weakened Germany but allowed her to remain a great power, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk temporarily reduced Russia to a third rate power. The treaty shocked and humiliated the Russians, but Lenin decided to accept the treaty because of how weak Russian forces were and calculated, correctly, that the Western Entente Powers would win the war against Germany ultimately.

While critics of the Versailles Treaty either downplay or ignore the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk imposed on Russia by Germany, arguable because it was much worse than the former treaty and undermines the narrative that Germany was not overly aggressive and ambitious in her war aims, they usually know next to nothing about the harsh peace treaty Germany inflicted upon France in the aftermath of the “Franco-Prussian War” in 1871. This treaty was no less humiliating and in some ways harsher than the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. It annexed Alsace-Lorraine to Germany, forced the French to pay 5 Billion Francs in war reparations (or 350 billion dollars in 2011 rates) and occupied perhaps a third of France’s territory (including Paris) until the French paid up. By contrast in 1919 France merely regained the lost provinces of Alsace-Lorraine, only a few towns along the Rhine were occupied by Entente forces and the huge sum that the Germans were suppose to pay after Versailles, initially set at 269 billion gold marks was reduced to 112 billion by 1929 and Germany suspended paying the reparations in 1931 after having paid little of the overall sum over the past decade. In fact Britain and America gave more money in loans to Germany by 50% in the interwar years compared to what money Germany paid in reparations during this period. By contrast the French managed to repay the whole sum of her reparations by 1873!

Adding another insult to France the Prussian King William I was crowned the German Emperor in the Palace of Versailles in occupied France in 1871 as well.

However, regardless of Germany’s harsh peace treaties towards France in 1871 and Russia in 1918, or German ambition and aggression in both conflicts, it is necessary to judge the 1919 Treaty against Germany on its own merits. Previous German imposed treaties on enemies did not necessarily justify an exceedingly harsh treaty being inflicted upon Germany, and if the treaty failed to guarantee peace in the long run then it certainly would deserve some censure at least.

Remembering Machiavelli’s quote above it would arguably have made more sense (in hindsight especially) for the major Entente Powers (Britain, France and America) to have either crushed German power decisively or been lenient and hoped a post Kaiser Germany could be convinced to rejoin the international community. Instead they settled upon a far from perfect middle course for various reasons. France, unsurprisingly after having suffered the most of the three powers with 6 million casualties (1/4 of them dead) wanted to severely curb German power. Meanwhile America, which had joined the war late, suffered little, was motivated by the well meaning (though arguably naive) Wilson’s 14 points which suggested to be lenient on Germany as well as producing a more peaceful, liberal and fair post war world. Britain adopted a mid position between both extremes wanting to restrain German power but arguably did not want to cripple it given that it would upset the balance of power in Europe (perhaps cynically assuming it would grant too much power to her traditional enemy France) as well as hurting German finance and trade which the British probably hoped would help rebuild the British and international economics and finance in the postwar era.

Ultimately the peace terms did not secure France against future German power and aggression, usher in Wilson’s unlikely utopian World, or help the German economy rebuild to help world finance and economics. With hindsight a treaty that would have allowed Germany to save face, rebuild her economy but also purge her militarism would have preferable but given the anger and pain felt by the Entente Powers in 1919, as well as their different interests, this was not likely to have occurred.

What of the actual peace terms? Besides the return of Alsace-Lorraine back to France, a limited amount of German territory, with a roughly equivalent portion of population, was given to countries such as Poland, Belgium, and oddly enough Denmark which had been neutral in the war. While such losses were not beneficial to Germany they were not disproportionate and did little to hurt Germany’s population, industry or power over all. Perhaps the most galling aspect for the Germans was the creation of Poland, which was partially carved out of German territory which separated Germany proper from East Prussia and also placed Danzig (a city with a majority German population) under international control. Thus, like the treaty in general, the territorial revisions did not significantly hurt German power, but angered the German people.

Other terms of the treaty included Germany losing her colonies, the aforementioned harsh reparations, as well as military restrictions that dictated Germany could not have tanks, submarines, warplanes or an army above 100,000 soldiers. Regarding the colonies there was generally little anger considering they gave little benefit to Germany and the majority of Germans did not care about them. The military restrictions obviously angered the military establishment in Germany (which had effectively dominated Germany since Hindenburg and Ludendorff took over in 1916) and much of the German population in a society that was heavily militaristic and regimented. While it was understandable from the Entente point of view to disarm Germany which had nearly beaten a considerably numerical and material superior alliance it is obvious with hindsight that declawing Germany completely would not be realistic unless the nation was also divided up and crushed.

However, by far the most insulting term from the German point of view was the war guilt clause which put the responsibility for the war squarely on Germany. Whatever one thinks about German ambition, aggression and war crimes in World War 1 this was not completely accurate, gave no real benefit (besides propaganda value) to the Entente and more than anything else alienated and angered the Germans. Besides attempting to exorcise wounded pride and being vindictive it is hard to see what the Entente Powers hoped to gain from this.

Either way, these were the terms the German delegation was given (or dictated to) when they came to Versailles in 1919: Significant but not ruinous territorial and population losses, a limited occupation of a few cities in the Rhineland, harsh war reparations (though no worse than what they had given to Russia or France), the loss of pointless colonies the Germans did not care about, but admittedly harsh military restrictions and an insulting clause blaming the whole war on Germany. The German delegation was shocked by the terms and wanted to consult with their government in Berlin and hoped to water down some of the terms. This was generally dismissed by the Entente Powers and in a notable verbal protest one of them said “What will history say?” The response by Georges Clemenceau (arguably France’s best leader in the war) was harsh and to the point: “They won’t say Belgium invaded Germany.”

Thereupon the German delegates signed the treaty, its clauses went into effect (though many would later be revised or quashed in Germany’s favor) and according to many historians, armchair generals, and commentators the outbreak of World War 2 was now inevitable. But how realistic is such a line of reasoning? Of course good arguments can be made that the Versailles Treaty had many flaws, and was PARTIALLY responsible for the outbreak of World War 2, but the idea that it made the later war inevitable is absurd. It assumes that the conduct of nations and politicians, their policies and decisions, events, and unseen circumstances had no bearing between 1919 and 1939 on influencing the path to war. The idea that one treaty alone could pull history and humanity by the hair screaming without the latter having any say or chance to influence events is illogical to say the least.

To take a few examples, that would be like suggesting the Franco-Prussian War led to World War 1 simply because of French resentment over the treaty in 1871 whereas in fact arms races, alliances, realpolitik, war plans, ambitious politicians, miscalculations, and a tragic event like the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand between 1871-1914 produced what was hardly an inevitable war. Or what if Rome had not taken Sardinia and Corsica after the First Punic War, had not backed Saguntum unconditionally against Hannibal, or the Carthargian military and council been more conciliatory to Rome so as to avoid the Second Punic War? Or look at the Cold War. How many times did it seem as though the Soviets and Americans would start World War 3, and an entire generation assumed they would eventually be nuked, but so many decisions, circumstances and leaders used their initiative to forego such an outcome? As the respected historian Robert Citano once said regarding war and history “What happened happened is not to say what happened had to happen.”

Small acts and quick decisions can have disproportionate effects in history! The ransacking of a French pastry shop in Mexico contributed to the French invasion of that country in the 1838, the search for an AWOL Japanese soldier near the Marco Polo Bridge was the catalyst to the start of World War 2 in Asia. Hezbollah never would have imagined that the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers in the summer of 2006 would lead to a major war against Israel and the massive bombing of Lebanon. A Kuwaiti delegation member to Iraq in the summer of 1990 would never have guessed that his insinuation that Iraqi women were like prostitutes would anger Saddam Hussein into invading Kuwait.

High officials and statesmen can also make quick and/or stupid decisions that lead to war no matter how much they would have preferred to avoid it. General MacArthur ignored clear warnings in the summer of 1950 not to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea by the Chinese while his political superior Harry Truman failed to reign him in. The new Sultan of the Zanzibar Sultanate dismissed a British ultimatum recklessly in 1896 without much thought considering his island was vulnerable to overwhelming British naval power and his country’s surrender after a mere 38 minutes made the war the quickest in history. Gamal Abdel Nasser’s declaration of a blockade of the Straits of Tiran in 1967 was made more as a sop to his people and Arab opponents than to antagonize Israel, but the latter saw it as an act of war and this led to the Six Day War which dramatically changed the Middle East.

The point being that no matter how seemingly important and far ranging certain things in history appear to be that nothing in history and human events is preordained or inevitable. The time period between 1919 and 1939 was no exception. Would any rational person or seasoned historian in 1919 have believed that a bitter, poor, mediocre Austrian artist, and former corporal named Adolf Hitler would come to control Germany and lead his nation to dominate Europe from the English Channel to the Volga? Would they believe that this relatively inexperienced uneducated upstart was capable of fooling the supposedly cultured and brilliant statesmen in Paris, London, and Washington D.C. or could out maneuver such a cynical and weathered politician like Stalin?

Keeping this in mind we should look at the events, decisions and mishaps between 1919 and 1939 with more scrutiny instead of being intellectually lazy by merely suggesting Versailles produced an unalterable timeline to World War 2. Between these two dates there was the Great Depression, Hitler’s rise to power, the Munich Conference, the Spanish Civil War, conflicts in Manchuria, Ethiopia, and China, policies to appease Germany, American commitment to isolationism, the rise of Communism in Russia, and Stalin’s opportunist foreign policy. There were treaties and agreements after 1919 that revised certain harsh terms of the Versailles Treaty, internal and foreign distractions for countries that could have confronted Hitler, countless missed opportunities to check German rearmament and prevent German expansion, and unique personalities such as Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, and Chamberlain all of which influenced the march to war.

Regarding events, there were plenty of far ranging, momentous, and decisive moments in history between 1919 and 1939 that did just as much to provoke WW2, if not more so, than the Versailles Treaty. The Great Depression is among the top of the list considering in the decade after Versailles many of its more harsh terms were watered down, Germany was recovering, and things were seemingly pointing towards peace. Yet the Great Depression crushed economies across the world, ruined millions of lives, and led to a rise in political movements and politicians that advocated often drastic methods and ideas such as Fascism, military expansion, racial hatred, etc. While some historians like to point a simple line from Versailles to Hitler his party was marginal and relatively unpopular until the Great Depression hit Germany hard and then suddenly his harsh rhetoric and revolutionary ideals had more appeal. For example, in the 1928 German election the Nazi party won 800,000 votes but in 1930 after the start of the Great Depression it won six and a half million votes in another election! And what if Hitler had been killed in his Beer Hall Putsch in 1923, or executed or imprisoned for decades instead of surviving and serving a short term. What if Hindenburg, who beat Hitler for the presidency of Germany in 1932, had not agreed to the political machinations in 1932-1933 that led to Hitler becoming Chancellor? Or what if Hindenburg had not died suddenly in 1934, allowing Hitler to consolidate power, but instead lived a few more years and kept Hitler mostly in check?

What if Japanese aggression in Manchuria and China, Italian aggression in Abyssinia, as well as the proxy war in the Spanish Civil War had not influenced the League of Nations and western powers like England and France to be distracted from the rise of the Nazis, German rearmament or fostered an increasingly hostile world environment that encouraged Hitler to be more aggressive? What if the French Army had called Hitler’s bluff when he remilitarized the Rhineland in 1936 (German forces had orders to retreat if the French Army attacked)?

What if instead of giving Hitler the Sudetenland during the Munich Conference in 1938 the French and British had backed Czechoslovakia unconditionally in the case of war? The Czech Army was strong, her defenses on the German border were said to be nearly as strong as the Maginot line, the German Army was much less effective in 1938, and Stalin was leaning towards backing the Czechs and Western powers over Germany. There was also the potential of a military coup being organized against Hitler by high officials such as General Halder who feared war at this point and some German representatives of this faction even contacted the French and British. Even had war broken out and Hitler had not backed down, the French, British, Czechoslovakia, and possibly even Russia would have had a much better chance of winning and limiting a conflict to part of Europe instead of the global conflagration that started in 1939.

What about the conduct of the great powers who could have opposed the rise of Hitler and the Nazis, German rearmament, and challenged him anytime from the occupation of the Rhineland to the invasion of Poland? Britain, France, America, and Russia missed many chances to avert war, or at least fighting one against Germany under favorable conditions that would have almost certainly resulted in the latter being defeated much easier than what actually occurred.

Even when war actually came in 1939 the British and French had most of the advantages against Germany such and manpower, troop, tank and artillery levels, more industry and resources, American lend lease, etc. As German rearmament and power peaked between Munich and the invasion of Poland this was the time the Germans had the best chance of starting and winning a war. However, it need not have come to this.

Regarding France, she is usually the most scapegoated for failing to stand up to German aggression due to her proximity to Germany, her supposedly first rate Army when World War 2 began, as well as her quick collapse in 1940. But this is extremely unfair. Soon after 1918 America retreated into isolationism, Russia succumbed to revolution, civil war, and the excesses of Stalinism, while Britain disarmed and focused on her empire. France had suffered the most casualties proportionately among these major powers, had much less population and industry than Germany, and after seeing her former allies lose interest in containing Germany the French were left to carry the bag. The fact that by 1939 the French had more artillery and more and better tanks than Germany, and the impressive Maginot Line is impressive given the population and industrial advantages Germany held.

Despite this, France made her share of mistakes (many mentioned above) which led to war. Relying on unreliable allies and the League of Nations to protect her or stop aggression are mistakes in hindsight, as was France’s missed opportunities to confronted Hitler in 1936 over the Rhineland or in 1938 over the Sudetenland. Meanwhile although the French were more likely to confront Hitler than the British in this period they still went along with appeasement even though the French Premier at the time of Munich questioned the wisdom of it famously saying after the agreement “the fools if only they knew what they are cheering.” On the other hand France deserves more credit than the other major powers because she rearmed most effectively in the late 1930s to confront Germany, and tried to form alliances to contain her, more often than Britain, America, and Russia.

Most of Britain’s mistakes overlap with France’s although the former has less excuses because she had more money, a bigger empire, did less to confront the Germans in the postwar period and did more to appease Germany. Foremost was to abandon France to confronting Germany more or less alone early on after 1918. Britain had by 1918 the biggest Airforce and Navy, and the most effective (if not biggest) Army among the Entente Powers so to leave France alone in this period was selfish and tragic. Besides appeasement which ranks high on the list, Britain also dropped the ball by refusing to close the Suez Canal to Italian supplies and reinforcements during Mussolini’s war against Abyssinia. At the least this would have crippled the war effort, and at the most signaled to Hitler that Britain could potentially oppose his aggression. Another mistake was the British-German naval agreement of 1935 (without consulting France) where the British allowed the Germans to build up to 35% of the Royal Navy’s tonnage. On one hand it seems lopsided in Britain’s favor but on the other it allowed the Germans to build far more naval forces than under the Versailles Treaty, obviously disheartened the French, and allowed Hitler to build submarines and capital ships that did a lot of damage to Britain in WW2.

America did next to nothing between 1919 and 1939 to stop World War 2. After rejecting the Treaty of Versailles and the death of Woodrow Wilson America retreated into isolationism until Pearl Harbor. On one hand history and world opinion is unfair to America because she is either condemned for being neutral or entering wars too late (WW1, WW2, Rwanda, Syria, etc.) while on the other she is accused of aggression and warmongering (rightly or wrongly) in other cases such as Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, Iraq, etc. Yet objectively, if with hindsight, America’s withdrawal from European affairs, and retreat into isolationism after World War 1 had tragic consequences. If Britain and France made mistakes in Europe between both wars America decided not to get involved at all. American foreign policy showed no real influence or importance in this period regarding treaties, appeasement, actions, policies, etc. This was also the case in Asia where America did nothing after Japan took Manchuria, invaded China in 1937 or bombed the USS Panay.

Again, those who criticize modern day American intervention and supposed militarism should think twice before condemning her anti-war and isolationism in an earlier period, but given that America, even after the Great Depression, was the world’s foremost financial and industrial power and had suffered little in WW1, it is regrettable that she did not back France’s efforts against Germany or chime in regarding Hitler’s successive aggression. It can, to America’s credit, be said that America allowed lend-lease to France and Britain after 1939, and did her best to prop up Britain when she stood alone against Germany from 1940 afterwards, but this was nearly too little too late.

What of Russia? Given her terrible losses during World War 1, the subsequent Russian Civil War, as well as Stalin’s brutal rule which included famine, collectivization, and terror campaigns against the Soviet people it would be an understatement to suggest that Russia was too busy dealing with internal matters to focus on restraining Germany in the inter-war period. This was not helped by the initial foreign backing of the White Russian forces in the Russian Civil war which saw British troops in North West Russia and American and Japanese troops in Siberia fighting Communist forces. This and the subsequent behavior of western states that treated the new Soviet state as a rogue regime unsurprisingly led Stalin to be more wary of Britain and France than a weakened Germany for most of the inter-war era. This resulted in some collaboration between Stalin and the Weimar Republic including German tank commanders and pilots training at Soviet sites such as in Kazan to circumvent German disarmament after the Versailles Treaty.

However, the coming to power of Hitler and the Nazis in 1933, along with their racist and anti-communist rhetoric and actions that were pointed at the Soviet Union (and stated openly in Mein Kampf), should have alerted Stalin to the growing danger of Germany. As Mein Kampf clearly advocated aggression against Russia, and as Hitler began dismissing the Versailles Treaty, and rearming Germany’s armed forces it was clearly in Stalin’s interests to oppose Germany. Stalin did in fact do some measures in the mid to late 1930s in such regards by backing the Republican faction in the Spanish Civil War, telling communist parties across Europe to oppose fascism, and debating backing France and Britain at the time of the Sudetenland crisis had they decided to confront instead of appeasing Hitler.

Yet in the end Stalin did nothing effective to deter or oppose Hitler and changed his focus in the late 1930s to reach an accommodation with him. With the purging of much of his military officers around this time Stalin’s armed forces were not in a great state and as Hitler rearmed, and annexed Austria and Czechoslovakia Stalin foresaw the outbreak of War between Germany and France and Britain over Poland. Thus he responded favorable to Hitler’s overtures in August 1939 and signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact which made Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany de facto allies from late 1939 to mid 1941. Stalin gambled that the Western allies and Germany would bleed each other in a long war which Russia could then exploit to overrun Europe. In reality it allowed Hitler to secure his eastern flank after the defeat of Poland (and Russia’s cynical absorption of Eastern Poland) and aided Germany by Russia supplying crucial resources such as oil and wheat which kept Germany’s war effort alive from 1939-1941. Stalin’s folly was clearly seen after the German invasion of Russia in June 1941 which led to the initial destruction of most of the Red Army, the deaths of 27 million Soviet people, the overrunning of most of European Russia, and the most destructive and inhumane front of World War 2.

Therefore, rather than using smart policies to prevent German rearmament, or to contain or confront Hitler, the Great powers failed to collaborate with each other and did not act decisively on their own in such regards either. France refused to use her military when it was still vastly superior to Germany’s during crucial episodes of German aggression. Britain relied on appeasement and did not rearm sufficiently in the inter-war era. America remained committed to isolationism and played no notable role in Europe for twenty years. Russia eventually sided with Hitler only to be backstabbed in 1941. It was a combination of caution, miscalculations, selfishness, and opportunism by policy makers in Paris, London, Washington and Moscow that led to all of this more so than a treaty in 1919 that was subsequently watered down and eventually ignored.

Finally, whatever the flaws of the Versailles Treaty what if it had been enforced? What if instead of watering down terms which allowed Germany to not pay the war reparations and rearm the former Entente Powers stood firm regarding the treaty’s terms? What if Britain and France had threatened or even invaded Germany at the first sign that Germany was breaking the Treaty? What if Europe united in the instance of any clause being breached and instituted a blockade, or trade embargo, that would quickly wreck a German economy that was reliant on imports? It is far easier to strangle aggression in the cradle and the major powers could have easily thwarted German aggression at its earliest manifestation, and could have even avoided a full scale war as late as 1938. In the end it was the discarding of the Treaty of Versailles, rather than the observance of it, that led to war.

The Treaty of Versailles helped create some of the conditions which led to World War 2, but was in no way decisive regarding the outbreak of war in 1939. Hitler was not predestined to come to power and be allowed to flaunt the Treaty at will. Britain, France, America, and Russia could have followed better polices, made smarter decisions, confronted or contained Germany, and exploited several opportunities to stop a major war from starting or at least starting one on terms much more favorable for them. Unforeseen events and trends such as the Great Depression, several wars between 1919 and 1939, and the rise of Fascism created an international atmosphere that was unpredictable, dangerous, and likely to lead to major conflict. The Treaty of Versailles itself was not ideal but many of its terms were later watered down or quashed, Germany was not forced to repay much of the supposedly ruinous war reparations and in the end the treaty was never enforced to any effective degree but abandoned by the former Entente Powers and ignored by Hitler. Perhaps the last word should be given to Margaret MacMillan who authored one of the best books on the Versailles Treaty, Paris 1919, in which she wrote it would be folly “to ignore the actions of everyone – political leaders, diplomats, soldiers, ordinary voters – for twenty years between 1919 and 1939” and that “when war came in 1939, it was the result of twenty years of decisions taken or not taken, not of arrangements made in 1919.” History is not predestined by a few flaps of butterfly wings but the result of countless decisions and factors which combine for the good or ill of humanity.


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Conflict in the Middle East Since 1945

Since 1945 the Middle East has arguably been the most volatile region on earth. It has seen more wars, insurgencies, terrorism, and other violent unpleasantries, than anywhere else. However, despite of this, conflict in the region is often misunderstood, or generalized, by people across the world. Biased and one-sided condemnations of European imperialism, American and Russian meddling, Israeli actions and Palestinian and Arab intransigence are typical, and often ignore the complex historical, cultural, economic and sectarian issues in the region. War in the Middle East is anything but simple but there are plenty of trends if one looks closely.

When looking at conflicts in the Middle East it should be noted they are often hard to define considering how varied they can be. Looking at a sample of approximately 50 conflicts in the Middle East Since 1945 the following can be stated. Four of them were colonial wars by France and Britain. Seventeen, as in 1/3rd involved Israel, ten involved the Palestinians, 4 involved the Russians, and 8 involved the Americans. Nine of the wars were mostly conventional wars (armies fighting armies), eleven were generally aerial campaigns conducted by the America, Russia or Israel, and the remaining were mostly asymmetrical conflicts regarding civil wars, insurgencies, or terrorist movements trying to change the status quo. The reason for the qualification of “mostly” in these categories is that much of these conflicts were hybrid conflicts involving aspects of conventional, airpower and asymmetrical warfare. For example, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 involved not only fighting the PLO resistance group but also the Syrian army. Likewise, America’s aerial campaign in Libya in 2011 was coordinated with Libyan resistance movements against Gaddafi’s regime. Needless to say much of these wars overlap with each other.

So what were these wars? The colonial conflicts were Britain’s war to secure Aden, her doomed attempt to keep Palestine after 1945, the combined Franco-British Suez conflict to subvert Egypt in 1956 (also supported by Israel), and France’s dirty war in Algeria.

Israel’s seventeen wars include the six “Arab-Israeli wars,” numerous aerial campaigns, and several asymmetrical conflicts against the PLO, Hamas, and Hezbollah. The Palestinians had ten wars, under many guises such as the PLO, Hamas, and/or other groups, eight of which were against Israel as well as involvement with the Jordanian and Lebanese civil wars.

Russia’s wars include their support for Syria during the never ending “Syrian Civil War,” the “Soviet-Afghan War” as well as the two Chechen Wars if we include these as part of Middle Eastern conflict (Chechnya technically being part of Europe). America’s eight wars include a UN mission in Somalia, the liberation of Kuwait, “Operation Desert Fox,” the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and aerial campaigns in Libya and Syria (and perhaps Kosovo even if it is outside the Middle East).

Finally, there are the asymmetrical conflicts (many, if not all, of which overlap with previously stated conflicts) regarding civil wars, insurgencies and terrorist movements. These include at least seven civil wars; Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Oman, Libya and Afghanistan; Kurdish insurgencies against Turkey and Iraq, Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda and ISIS conflicts in the region, and other resistance and/or terrorist movements in the region. This list is far from being exhaustive as there were probably dozens of more conflicts in the region during the same timeframe.

From this we can see a few trends. Nine of the conflicts (less than 20%) were predominately stand up conventional fights (5 of Israel’s wars, the “Gulf War,” the “Iran-Iraq War,” the short war between Jordan and Syria in 1970, and the limited war between Egypt and Libya in 1977. Meanwhile the predominantly aerial campaigns involved American efforts in Kosovo, Libya, Syria and Iraq, Russia’s late efforts in Syria, 3 Israeli actions against Hezbollah in Lebanon, and another 3 against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. As already noted the rest are various types of asymmetrical conflicts.

Furthermore we can divide the conflicts between wars involving foreign states (Russia, America, European), Israel, and those waged between Arab and Muslim states/groups. One third of the conflicts involve Israel, foreign states are involved in another third, while inter-regional (not including Israel or outsiders) involves at least 30, or perhaps much more, if you include low grade fighting against Arab and Muslim nations and groups.

What about results, who won these wars? Unfortunately victory and defeat in the Middle East is controversial, not only if we separate military success from political, or even propaganda coups, but also because few wars in the region have involved the complete defeat, or overthrow, of nations or often even resistance groups. Meanwhile the tendencies of Arab states, and resistance groups, claiming victory just because they survive, and the fact that long term results of these conflicts are often mixed further complicates easy determinations of victory and defeat. However, on one hand it is easy to say who has won according to pure military and political terms. Often armies, resistance groups, and terrorist movements has been so smashed that no objective analyst would debate the military result. However, as Clausewitz noted “war is a continuation of politics by other means” and given the usual relatively limited nature of war in the Middle East a nation, or non-state entity, can claim victory if their political goals were accomplished. The third, perhaps most laughable, claim of victory is propaganda victories by nations or groups which claim survival as victory. To make things even more confusing the weird circumstance of the region can result in several sides claiming victory. All of this will be addressed below.

Unsurprisingly military victories are the easiest to show. It is hard for one side to claim they won the battle after a humiliating retreat, losing most of their tanks and planes, and their capital is threatened. In all conventional wars there has been an obvious winner in military terms. Israel decisively beat the Arab armies in all but one or two stand up fights, America dominated the “Gulf War,” Egypt beat Libya and Jordan beat Syria in their respective wars, and even Iraq thoroughly smashed Iran’s army at the end of the “Iran-Iraq War.” The same goes regarding asymmetrical conflicts in general; most insurgent or terrorist groups losing the military struggle. Meanwhile with perhaps one or two exceptions as in Afghanistan in the early 1990s no resistance, or terrorist movement, came to power in the region by physically defeating government forces or overthrowing regimes (at least not without considerable conventional or airpower backing by foreign states). Generally they have been crushed brutally as the Kurdish and Muslim brotherhood insurgencies, or other resistance groups, via harsh Arab despots.

Even in the colonial wars the hated imperialists were never physically defeated but forced to withdraw due to public opinion and political considerations at home. However, in rare cases an army can suffer military defeat at the hands of guerrillas such as during Russia’s first war against Chechnya. In this conflict two of Russia’s columns were mauled during the initial assault on Grozny, she suffered countless ambushes against her convoys, she failed to resolve the “Budyonnovsk hospital hostage crisis,” and even had her forces trapped and humiliated by Chechen rebels in Grozny at the end of the war. Libya was also ultimately defeated by a guerrilla army of Toyota trucks with anti-tank weapons at the end of the “Chadian-Libyan Conflict.”

Aerial campaigns are more controversial regarding military results considering not only have they usually been against mobile, and lightly armed, guerrillas and terrorists that are hard to track and kill from the air, but that the campaigns themselves have often targeted political will and non-military targets. America’s air efforts are mixed; in Kosovo the Serbian army was not seriously hurt, the operation against Iraq in 1998 was perhaps a half victory in degrading Saddam’s capabilities, her air campaign in Syria hurt ISIS but did not effectively protect her rebel allies on the ground from the Assad Regime or Russia, but her support of the rebels in Libya in 2011 was an unequivocal success regarding the overthrow of Gaddafi by degrading his armed forces. Perhaps Russia’s air campaign in Syria by contrast was exceedingly successful, supporting Assad’s forces while hurting ISIS and punishing America’s allies on the ground. Meanwhile Israel arguably produced poor military results in her three aerial campaigns against Hizbollah in Lebanon but did relatively better in her three against Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

However military results, especially in limited war and conflicts regarding insurgency and terrorism, are not always decisive and in these cases political considerations are often more important. Whatever impressive military victories America, Israel, Russia and the colonial Powers have accomplished against armies, and insurgents, their political results have rarely proven as beneficial. Israel won every conventional clash against states and armies but only one of them, against Egypt in 1973, resulted in a peace treaty (ironic considering this was the only war Egypt rebuffed Israel several times in battle). Of course Israel won her statehood in 1948, and bought a decade of tranquillity against Egypt after 1956, yet her greatest victory in 1967 burdened her with hostile Palestinian territory in Gaza, and the West Bank, and led to terrible the “War of Attrition,” and later the “Yom Kippur War,” which were more bloody, and demoralizing, for Israel than anything before or since.

Israel’s record in aerial campaigns is also mixed: Unsurprisingly with the considerable anti-Israeli sentiment in the UN, and international opinion, and the fact Israel is now seen as Goliath and the Palestinians as David, Israel has rarely won the battle of public opinion in most of these struggles. Yet in 4 out of 6 of her aerial assaults Israel can claim political victory (oddly enough even in 2006 during perhaps Israel’s worst showing in any conflict). Israel has managed to gain relative peace in the south against Hamas’s rocket, and other attacks, and has not had to end her blockade, recognize Hamas or concede any notable concession to the resistance group. Against Hezbollah Israel’s air campaigns in the 1990s accomplished little political gains but the 2006 campaign, whatever its many failings, seems to have deterred Hezbollah from provoking Israel and the latter has enjoyed over a decade of relative quiet in the north thus far.

America secured her political goals in the “Gulf War,” which was liberating Kuwait at small cost and not overthrowing Saddam Hussein (which was never seriously considered at the time). Regarding two of her air campaigns, Kosovo and Libya the Americans secured their political objectives outright (even if her aerial campaign against Serbia was relatively inept), but her other two against Syria and Iraq can be seen as relative political failures since neither Saddam’s Iraq, or ISIS and Assad’s regime, were decisively defeated, or forced to change their detrimental regional policies. America’s war in Somalia resulted in a political defeat when Bill Clinton pulled its forces out of the country after the “Battle of Mogadishu” in 1993 where the American forces scored a notable tactical victory in killing hundreds of militants but lost 19 servicemen, some of the latter who were dragged through the streets live on TV which obviously shocked America.

Finally, there are the ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In one sense America secured many of her political goals by overthrowing Saddam Hussein and the Taliban, ultimately weakening Al-Qaeda, and installing nascent democracies in these countries. However, the price has been too high regarding American soldiers, the cost to American credibility and prestige, not to mention her finances, and especially regarding the civilian losses in Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile the budding democracies in these countries have not so far proven to be effective at surviving on their own, or preventing the rise of ISIS or the resurgence of other terrorist groups.

Russia has secured her political goals in two of her wars; in the “Second Chechen War” she finally subjugated Chechnya (though it took ten years and terrific casualties) as well as her intervention in Syria which safeguarded Assad’s regime, and weakened both ISIS and America’s Syrian resistance allies. However, Russia withdrew in humiliation after failing to conquer Chechnya in the “First Chechen War” and ultimately her 10 year war in Afghanistan was a failure considering the Mujaheddin were never contained, or defeated, and Russia’s client state in Kabul later fell to the resistance fighters.

Britain and France failed politically in their wars despite often impressive military results. Obviously colonialism was discredited, and dying, after “World War 2,” with ironically the Americans, the Soviet Union and the UN all being united against European imperialism. Meanwhile the colonial powers were weakened in the post war period, and their populaces in no mood to fight conflicts that had little moral or international support. Finally, given that there was almost zero support from the indigenous people for the colonial powers that were occupying their country we see there was no political legitimacy at all for these conflicts. While there were diehards in the political, and military, establishments in London and Paris, there was no international support, little public support, and no indigenous support, for colonial wars.

Looking from the other side we see that resistance groups, and Arab states, have accomplished their political goals much of the time. In the case of the colonial wars public opinion in Britain and France, superpower pressure, and the sheer cost of war have handed victory to the underdogs despite the fact the latter never accomplished significant military reverses on their enemies. Russia has had to admit political defeat in Chechnya (in the first conflict), America withdrew from Somalia, while whatever gains both nations accomplished in Chechnya, Iraq or Afghanistan can probably be described as “pyrrhic victories,” despite not losing in the field.

In Israel’s case she has survived all existential threats but the Palestinians scored a notable victory due to the “First Intifada” via the ensuing the Oslo Accords, while Israel’s 1982 overwhelming victory against Syria in the Bekaa valley, and the PLO in Beirut, ultimately made things worse with the subsequent rise of Hezbollah. Eventually Israel tired so much of the conflict in Southern Lebanon against Hezbollah that she withdrew from Lebanon altogether (which has to be seen as a propaganda victory for Hezbollah at best or a political one at worst).

Meanwhile the Arab states are not proficient at military victory in conventional warfare but they have rarely failed to beat insurgents and terrorists (perhaps partly because they are not as constrained by brutal means, or media considerations like Israel or western democracies are). There is no way Israelis, or Americans, would have been permitted to carpet bomb a city like the Russians did in Grozny, to use gas like the Egyptians in Yemen or the Iraqis against the Kurds, to massacre 30,000 civilians indiscriminately like the Syrians did in Hama in 1982 or to shell Palestinian refugee camps mercilessly as the Jordanians and Syrians did in the 1970s.

Besides outright political victory Arab regimes, and resistance groups, can still be seen as relatively successful when using propaganda to claim they have won conflicts by merely surviving. This should not be dismissed because in general Arab states, and resistance groups, have been far more adept at using propaganda in the Middle East then the well meaning, if naive Americans, and the tactically minded and short term focused Israelis. Israel, and America, are liberal democracies with a relatively free media and much of it is often ran by elements unfavourable to their war efforts whereas the Arab states and resistance groups (and Russia), being non-democratic and far from Liberal, can dominate media and public opinion. Therefore while the military strength of Arab armies, guerrilla and terrorist forces can be beaten by their enemies the former can easily manipulate the media.

Therefore the Arabs claim America did not defeat Saddam Hussein in 1991 but was stopped from taking Iraq. Meanwhile Israel may have taken a lot of Arab territory in 1967 but Cairo, Amman, and Damascus was saved from Zionist occupation. It did not matter if the PLO was kicked out of Jordan in 1970, exiled from Lebanon in 1982 and forced to Tunisia, it still survived. According to Arab propaganda in the Middle East their states, and resistance groups, have won every battle despite the fact Israel is a thriving democracy, America is still present in the Middle East, the Arab states are collapsing, or on the brink or anarchy, or that most of the people in the Middle East are still poor, oppressed, and disenfranchised.

Then there is the odd point that such limited, and unpredictable, warfare in the region can even allow several sides to claim victory. Besides the aforementioned illusions there are plenty of incidents were several sides have actually legitimately won. The “Arab-Israeli wars” are illustrative. Israel survived and beat back the Arab armies in the first conflict but Jordan took the West Bank while even a weakened Egyptian retained the Gaza Strip. In 1956 Israel beat Egypt in the Sinai but Egypt accomplished a decisive political coup in surviving the British, and French, attempt to subjugate her. In 1973 Israel pushed back the Syrians close to Damascus, and crossed the Suez Canal to surround an entire Egyptian army, but there is no doubt that Egypt won the political battle by humiliating the Israeli army in the first few days of the war and allowing Sadat to bring Israel to the peace table. Israel’s lopsided military victory in 1982 destroyed the PLO in Lebanon but Syria was the ultimate beneficiary in the long run. This is not limited to nations as Hezbollah may have had to pull back from the Lebanon border after 2006 but she now has more rockets (in fact ten fold), and is in a vastly superior position ten years later. Meanwhile Israel’s efforts to stop the “First Intifada” were successful overall but the PLO could be satisfied by the results of the Oslo accords.

However, it is one thing to claim political and/or military kudos in limited wars, quite another whether or not it accomplishes nations’, or resistance groups’, long term goals. For it is obvious that since there are so many conflicts, often continuations of previous ones, that few wars in the region have produced overwhelming, longterm, decisive results. The colonial wars were decisive given that it forever broke the power of Britain, and France, to manipulate the region. Perhaps the “Arab-Israelis Wars” can be seen as decisive, at least in military means: Not only has Israel survived in the region, but no nation (s) can realistically threaten her with conventional military power, and since 1982 all of her threats have been from terrorism, and resistance groups. As such of Israel’s two major long term goals; survival and peace she has secured the former completely. However, regarding peace Israel’s wars have only had limited success. Egypt and Jordan have peace treaties with Israel but otherwise the Arab states, and resistance groups, are still hostile at best, or cold and indifferent at worse.

America gets a lot of censure for her wars in the region but realistically the majority of her long term goals have been secured so far. Israel has survived, America’s military presence in the region is still strong, most of the Arab states are de-facto (if unenthusiastic) American allies, and the access to most of the oil in the region is still open to America, Europe and her allies. American rivals like China and Russia have limited influence in the region, compared to America at least, while her enemies in the region like Iran, Syria, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS are often nuisances, and pose some threats, but are generally contained and mostly in their decline. Meanwhile despite small pinprick successes few terrorist plots have succeeded, let alone killed a lot of Americans, on mainland America since 9/11 and thus technically she is winning the “war on terror.”

However, in two areas American goals have failed. Despite decades of efforts America has never solved the “Israeli-Palestine” conflict which remains a constant source of bitterness, and anger, in the region. Additionally, George Bush Junior’s plan to create a vibrant and stable democracy in Iraq, which would hopefully lead to more Liberalism, and freedom in the region, has also unravelled as seen by the chaos in Iraq, and the dashed hopes of the “Arab Spring.”

Russia gets some points for besting American interests in Syria, bullying Turkey, and her eventual conquest of Chechnya, but realistically these victories are more for show and generally hollow. Given how much power the Soviet Union had in the region at her height Russia’s position there today is very limited. Whereas Russia’s client states used to include Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria now only Syria remains an ally while the others, along with the vast majority of the nations of the Middle East are in America’s camp. The same goes for resistance groups; the PLO, and other Palestinian and terrorist groups, in the region, and Europe, used to be allied with the Russians but now they are either quashed, contained, switched sides or dominated by countries like Iran and Syria. The major oilfields are in countries allied to America, Russian power in most Arab countries is weak, and the prospect of Russia gaining more influence at America’s expense in the region is unfavourable for the foreseeable future.

What about the Arab States, Iran, and resistance groups? In the case of survival, most regimes have admittedly survived wars stand up wars, and insurgencies, trying to overthrow them (Iraq and Afghanistan being notable exceptions). However, their efforts to conquer other territories, or expand their ideologies, have usually been failures: Saddam never kept any Iranian territory and was pushed out of Kuwait, Libya failed to take Chad, Syria ultimately had to withdrew from Lebanon, and the physical borders of the region have barely changed since the postwar period. Meanwhile Nasser’s Pan-Arabism, the Baathist ideology of Iraq and Iran’s fundamentalist template have not successfully transformed the region. Generally the individual Arab states are American client states whether they like it or not and have little power, or even motivation, to challenge America, or Israel’s, main interests in the region.

Perhaps theocratic Iran has done the best to spread her influence and flout America and Israel. She has considerable support, and even militants, in Lebanon and Iraq, and propped up Syria, Hamas and Hizbollah which give terrible head aches to America and Israel. Meanwhile her quest for nuclear weapons has the potential to make her untouchable and give her more regional influence. Yet Iran’s aging theocrats are becoming more out of touch with the Iranian people, more fissures are developing between moderated and fanatics in the regime, western sanctions are eroding Iran’s economy and as such Iran’s future of presenting a major counter-balance to America is far from certain.

Most resistance groups have either been crushed, contained or lost their legitimacy, yet a few of them like Hamas, Hezbollah, and maybe for awhile ISIS are still significant. Hamas cannot expand much but it still has enough foreign connections, and support of the people, to survive almost indefinitely. Hezbollah is still very strong, controls much of Lebanon and enjoys unlimited support from Syria and Iran. It also has more than 100,000 rockets pointed at Israel and is probably the latter’s biggest threat. ISIS still has shock value and seen as a major enemy but its power will probably continue to degrade considering all Arab states, their masses, and the rest of the world is against it (even most hardcore Islamists and terrorist groups think ISIS has gone too far). The Palestinian movement it should be stressed, is no closer to destroying Israel, let alone gaining any notable territory or concessions, after nearly 70 years of conflict. The Kurds, with the exception of northern Iraq, have also failed in their attempts at statehood, the Muslim Brotherhood came to power in Egypt only briefly, and Al-Qaeda’s vision of establishing a caliphate from Morocco to the Gulf is a mirage.

What has been the cost in blood, and refugees, since 1945 in the Middle East? Unfortunately stats regarding war deaths in the region are often unreliable for various reasons. Some of this is due to poor documentation, but also because Arab nations, and resistance groups, do not record their deaths as accurately as westerners and Israelis, partially due to the fact the latter are more casualty sensitive, and partially due to the less organized nature of the former. Meanwhile most belligerents have political, or propaganda, reasons to exaggerate, or downplay casualties. Obviously all sides want to maximize the number of enemy combatants killed, be it Western or Arab soldiers, or resistance personal.

Civilian losses are another matter; obviously Arab states threatened by foreigners and Israel, will exaggerate losses while the latter want to minimize them. Resistance groups will also maximize these no matter who they are fighting. On another level occupiers or armies; Israeli, Americans, Russians, Arabs, etc, will try to exaggerate how many civilians died via resistance, or terror groups, and minimize how many were killed by their own forces.

Then there is the bias of authors who are either too pro-West, Israeli, Arab, Russia, etc, that cherry pick statistics to support their cases. The point being that it is unsurprising that in a region where nothing is certain, and everything is controversial, that there is often no authoritative estimate for casualties. For example estimates of the “Algerian War” put the death toll between 300,000 to 1 million, the “Gulf War” between 10,000 and 100,000, the “Iran-Iraq War” between several hundred thousand and perhaps 1 million, the “Iraq War” from 200,000 to 1 million and the “Soviet-Afghan War” from 500,000 to 2 million. No doubt the maxim regarding the 3 kinds of lies is very relevant for conflict in the Middle East. Thus the author does not pretend all of the statistics he has written are accurate but he has done his best to make educated guesses based on common sense while rejecting the more absurd estimates.

Some of the bloodier wars include the “Iran-Iraq War,” which resulted in at least 400,000 deaths, the “Soviet-Afghan War” which resulted in at least 1 million, the ongoing “Syrian Civil War” which has so far cost 400,000, the French war in Algeria that cost at least 300,000, the “Lebanese Civil War” with 150,000 dead and America’s recent war in Afghanistan which has probably had 100,000 deaths at least. The “Arab-Israeli Wars” by contrast have been relatively tame with most of them costing close to 20,000 dead while the intifadas, Israel’s aerial campaigns, and her smaller wars have all cost less than 5000, most costing under 2000 lives. Russian, and American, aerial campaigns have also not been overly bloody despite the considerable controversy and moral outrage sparked by them, with generally a few thousand deaths.

Other relatively bloody conflicts include the two Russian wars in Chechnya (together costing probably more than 50,000), the “Gulf War,” with its approximately 20,000 deaths, the “Algerian Civil War” with probably at least 100,000, the Kurdish insurgencies in Turkey and Iraq which resulted in at least 100,000-250,000 and the Islamist uprising, mostly the Muslim Brotherhood, in Syria which arguably resulted in 40,000 dead.

After this, at least regarding the examples we have looked at, the death tolls are not so high as they are the result of smaller civil wars, aerial campaigns, or more manageable insurgencies and terrorist campaigns. Most of the aerial campaigns have not killed over a few thousand (soldiers and civilians) and this is also the case with many civil war like those in Oman, or Jordan, as well as most Al-Qaeda (Iraq and Afghanistan being significant exceptions) and Muslim brotherhood insurgencies.

What trends can we deduce from these butcher bills? Perhaps the first is despite the inherent anti-Semitism in the Arab World, along with international opinion being mostly against Israel regarding Middle Eastern issues, is that Israel’s wars, despite their frequency and controversy, has killed a relatively low amount of people killed in the wars in the region for the past 7 decades. Statistics can always be argued over but all of Israel’s wars, aerial adventures, and anti-terrorist campaigns have probably not killed over 150,000 (which is still significant though well short of many wars in the region). Many wars by themselves have killed not only as much, but often several times more (French War in Algeria, the Lebanese, Syrian and Algerian Civil Wars, the war in Iraq, the “Soviet-Afghan War,” and the “Iran-Iraq War).” Furthermore it would be unfair to blame Israel for the outbreak of all of these wars, as well as all the deaths as many of these conflicts were provoked or initiated from the other side (1948, 1967, 1973, 2000) or involved inter-Arab killings which were hardIy Israel’s fault.

Then there is America, who the Ayatollah called the “Greater Satan,” Israel being the “Little Satan.” Five of America’s wars, 4 aerial campaigns and her part in the UN mission in Somalia, did not result in a disproportionate amount of deaths, while the “Gulf War” cost at least 20,000 and her Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan tragically more (probably at least 200-300,000 in Iraq and 100,000 in Afghanistan). However, these wars cannot be compared to France’s dirty war in Algeria, Russia’s near genocidal treatment of Afghanistan and Chechnya, nor the World War 1 style of carnage in the “Iran-Iraq War.” No doubt the wars to liberate Kuwait, and respond to 9/11 by going into Afghanistan, were justified (Saddam invaded Kuwait and Al-Qaeda attacked America unprovoked) but the “Iraq War” was clearly unnecessary, and unjustified. However, even in Iraq and Afghanistan it is arguable that the inhabitants killed more of each other than America killed of them. Few people like blackwater, and corporate armies, but American forces did not have death squads like the Sunni and Shiite militias in Iraq, and were not as blood thirsty and unforgiving as Al-Qaeda in both countries.

Whatever her flaws, and naiveness, America legitimately wanted to created democracy, and freedom, in these countries and wanted to safeguard the rights of marginalized groups (be it Sunni, Shiite and Kurds) whereas most of their enemies would rather have had sectarian, authoritative and Islamic fanatical regimes. However, as the saying goes, “the road to hell is paved with good intentions,” and American wars in the Middle East since 2001, while not damaging American long term goals overall, has certainly killed too many people, lost most of the Arab and Muslim populations of the region’s confidence, and damaged her reputation both at home and abroad.

We also have the europeans’ part in these wars; France, Britain and Russia. Ironically Britain, the most powerful colonial power in the world, which not only had the most possessions in the region, but also held the most influence there even before the 20th century until the war in 1956, killed the least amount of people in these conflicts than her fellow europeans, America, Israel and certainly Arabs and others since 1945. Britain’s wars in Aden and Egypt were relatively small, and cheap, affairs versus other struggles while her conduct in Palestine against the Jewish insurgents after WW2 was constrained by international opinion and the fact it was politically unacceptable to be harsh against a people of which many of whom had just survived Nazi concentration camps. As such the cost of these wars were relatively small; 2000 killed in Aden, less than 5000 killed in the “Suez Crisis” and a marginal number fighting the Jewish insurgents in Palestine.

France was only involved directly in two of these conflicts, Suez and Algeria, and indirectly in one, Libya’s wars against Chad, but her dirty war in Algeria had a disproportionate effect in blood and politics. While France’s conduct in Algeria was perhaps not as bad as the worst Arab regimes, one thinks of Saddam against the Kurds and Assad against Hama in 1982, it was worse than American, Israeli and British excesses in their wars. The indiscriminate bombing of cities, widespread practice of torture, summary executions, the use of concentration camps, the insubordination of military leaders and factions that not only defied political authority, but actively tried to overthrow it, were commonplace in France’s war in Algeria but thankfully absent, or at least diminished, in other democratic countries’ conflicts in the region. France, unsurprisingly with these means, crushed the rebellion in Algeria, though not the rebel forces across the border, and certainly did not win the political battle for world opinion, in Algeria and ultimately even among the French people. Not only did France lose her legitimacy to stay in Algeria, but French military leaders in Algeria rebelled against the politicians and even threatened to overthrow the French government leading Charles De Gaulle no choice but to abandon Algeria to prevent a potential civil war in France!

Meanwhile Russia, which has generally escaped the visceral criticism aimed at foreign nations who have waged war in the Middle East, has probably killed more Arabs and Muslims then Britain, France, America and Israel combined. In the “Soviet-Afghan war” alone at least 1 million, some say 2 million, were killed. Russian conduct here was just as bad as the French in Algeria and mass indiscriminate bombing, torture, reprisals and atrocities against civilians were widespread and uncompromising. The same goes for Chechnya in two wars where Grozny was more or less carpet bombed twice and perhaps 50,000 Chechens (in a population barely over a million) were killed. None of this saved the Soviet Client in Kabul or brought prosperity, and democracy, to Chechnya.

Finally, we come to the Arabs, Palestinians, Iranians and other indigenous factions (stage or substate). These states, or groups, are often cast as the victims of imperialist, American and Israeli designs (which unfortunately has too often been true) while their own self serving actions and crimes have usually been dismissed in popular media. While much of the “Arab-Israeli Wars” and Israel’s conflicts, can be blamed on Israel much can also be blamed on the Arabs and Palestinians. Obviously in the case of the colonial, and Russia’s, wars, the Arabs and indigenous people are innocent, but in the case of America’s interventions the record is mixed again. American interventions in Kosovo, Libya, and Somalia were humanitarian missions, Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda were unequivocally the aggressors regarding the “Gulf War” and 9/11, yet the “Iraq War” was unprovoked and a mistake, while her bombing campaigns against Iraq in the 90s, and the current one in Syria, are controversial regarding motives and potential results. Yet the majority of the conflicts in the region have been inter-Arab, and Muslim, conflicts where foreign, and Israeli, influence is a secondary factor or non-existent.

How does this relate to bloodletting in the region. As stated above it is unfair to blame all deaths in Israeli, American and foreign wars on the the former and say the indigenous forces deserve no blame but it is also obvious that the latter cannot be totally held accountable for the same in their conflicts (which maddeningly enough overlaps with the formers’ wars too often). However, a share in the Arab-Israeli wars, the fact many foreign wars were provoked by Arab states or terror groups, realizing that most civil wars in the region are domestic, and not foreign problems, and remembering that most terrorist elements are also in this category, means that Arabs and Muslims have too many conflicts and problems where they cannot outsource blame.

Let us assume half blame for the “Arab-Israeli Wars” on the Arab side (the Arab states were not provoked by Israel in 1948, certainly provoked Israel in 1967, and bare some partial blame for other conflicts). Meanwhile let us blame half of the conflicts over Lebanon, West Bank and Gaza on them as well since Israel has either withdrawn from these territories at some point to try peace or has been occasionally attacked from them as well. Surely Israel’s policies, and occupations, have not been stellar but Hezbollah could have made peace after Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, Hamas could have tried peace overtures after Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005, and the Palestinian authority could have tried harder for peace in the 1990s instead of allowing militant groups to keep attacking Israel. This gives us 60,000 or more deaths for the Arabs here alone.

What about pure indigenous wars and conflicts? The “Iran-Iraq War,” civil wars in Algeria, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, Oman and Afghanistan, Kurdish, Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda and other insurgencies and terrorist campaigns are too numerous to count. It is easy to blame war, and oppression, on foreign and Israeli machinations but in the rest of the globe former colonies and oppressed nations have become more democratic and liberal (like in East Asia) rather than succumb to the vicious cycle of warfare in the Middle East.

So what are the death tolls of these indigenous wars and conflicts? Regarding the more bloody contests there was probably at least 400,000 deaths for the “Iran-Iraq War,” 400,000 in Syria’s Civil War so far, 150,000 in the “Lebanese Civil War,” 100,000 in Algeria’s last civil war, at arguably 250,000 killed between Kurds fighting the Turks and Iraqis, while the North Civil War in Yemen cost at least 100,000. This produces an astounded 1,400,000 deaths in these conflicts at least considering many of these estimates are on the lower side put forth by various sources. Of course while these are the worst cases there are far more indigenous conflicts such as the “Egyptian-Libyan War,” Libya’s multiple wars against Chad, the brief war between Jordan and Syria, the “Jordanian Civil War,” multiple civil wars in Afghanistan and Yemen, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist campaigns across the region. If we added the deaths from these conflicts as well the death toll would be notably higher.

Yet at 1,400,000 deaths the number is staggering enough. It is nearly ten times the amount of those estimated killed in Israel’s wars and conflicts, more than two or three times the amount of those killed in American-led wars in the region, one million more than the French killed in her few conflicts, and perhaps 100 times as many killed by Britain’s fading colonial wars. Only Russia with at least 1 million killed in Afghanistan, and tens of thousands killed in Chechnya, is close to matching how many people were killed by Arabs, and Muslims, in the Middle East since 1945.

What do these death tolls suggest? Firstly, Arab and Muslim groups, and nations, have killed more people, especially each other, than either America, Israel, Britain or France and even Russia. This should be qualified again because this not only includes the perhaps 1,400,000 killed in inter-Arab, Muslim conflict but a huge percentage in other wars that involve foreign states and Israel. Shiites and Sunnis arguably killed more of each other in Iraq than America during the war in 2003-11, Algerians may have killed more of each other in the “Algerian War” than the French (especially if we consider the fate of France’s Harkis Algerian allies at the end of the conflict), while Arabs, especially the Jordanians and Syrians, killed thousands of Palestinians, and the Palestinian groups themselves have killed thousands of each other rather than firmly unite against Israel.

All of this quashes the idea the the Arab nations and Muslim groups in the region are purely victims of outside, or Israeli influence and war, or that they themselves are inherently peaceful and just want to be left alone. It also questions the idea that their main enemies are America, and Israel, for according to the number of wars they have fought amongst themselves, as well as the lopsided death tolls, the main enemy of Arab and Muslim factions in the Middle East seem to be themselves.

The death tolls also tell us that Israel, despite being the most criticized country in, and outside, the region for conflict in the Middle East, has actually killed the least amount of people (with the exception of Britain). All other foreigner nations, and especially the Arabs, have killed exceedingly more people and Muslims than Israel. American wars in the region would not be prohibitively bloody were in not for the “Iraq War” (which has killed much more than half of all those killed in her wars in the region) but even here the Arabs have probably killed more or each other than America. France had her one very bloody war in Algeria with 300,000 dead and the much less costly joint “Suez Crisis” with Britain, but despite the terrible conduct of French forces in Algeria France’s reputation, and influence, in the region is relatively healthy. Britain gets perhaps less censure in the region than Israel, and America, yet her colonial past, and recent support of American ventures in the region has not done her many favours either. Yet Israel, Britain, France and America have all killed less Arabs, and Muslims, than the Russia has. However, Russia is not nearly as criticized, censured or demonized as much as any of the former, especially Israel and America.

Besides death tolls there has been many refugee crises in the region since 1945. Unsurprisingly the most commonly known is the “Palestinian refugee crisis.” During the “First Arab-Israeli War” perhaps 700,000 Palestinians were kicked out, or fled, from territory which became Israel and went to the West Bank, the Gaza Strip or other Arab countries. This was made worse in 1967 when Israel defeated Egypt and Jordan, conquered the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and a further 300,000 Palestinians fled again, mostly to Jordan or other Arab countries. Few of these Palestinians were allowed to return and today there is probably 5 million Palestinian refugees if we include descendants of the original refugees from 1948. Today most of these live in poverty in overcrowded refugee camps in neighbouring Arab countries who have rarely tried to integrate them into their societies. Meanwhile countless Palestinians live in terrible conditions in the Israeli de facto occupied West Bank, or under Hamas in the tiny Gaza Strip that is under Israeli blockade and enjoys a poor standing of living.

The Palestinians also had poor luck when the PLO was driven from Jordan after the massacre of “Black September” and then later from Lebanon after Israel’s invasion in 1982. Even little Kuwait was ruthless when after the “Gulf War” she expelled 200,000 Palestinians from the Kingdom, partially out of revenge for the PLO supporting Saddam Hussein. Omar Gaddafi also expelled thousands of Palestinians from Libya in the mid-1990s in reaction to the Oslo Accords.

While everyone knows of the poor, hapless Palestinian refugees few today remember the at least 800,000 Jews who were expelled from Arab countries after the 1948 conflict. This number was higher than the 700,000 Palestinians who were expelled from Israel during this conflict but ironically it actually benefited Israel since she integrated these refugees successfully to make the country stronger. This is in stark contrast to the marginalized Palestinian refugees in Arab countries who are generally poor, enjoy few rights and are cramped into refugee camps even after nearly seven decades.

Another little known refugee crisis involved the European settler community in Algeria in the 1960s; the so called “Pied Noires” who not only had enjoyed more rights, and privileges, than the majority Arab population but generally maltreated and dismissed the latter as well. After the French withdrew from Algeria in lieu of her failed colonial war most of the Pied Noires, perhaps 800,000, fled to France in 1962 with most of the remainder fleeing in later years.

Several million Kurds have become refugees in Europe, and middle eastern countries, thanks to several wars waged by Iraq and Turkey versus Kurdish movements. There are also several hundred thousands of Chechen refugees and while this may seem low compared to other cases it should be noted that this is proportionally devastating considering Chechnya’s population is not much over 1 million today.

For decades Afghanistan had the worst refugee crisis in the world, with up to 6 million during the “Soviet-Afghan War.” After the fall of the Taliban the majority of these returned home but with rising violence in the new American war in Afghanistan there are now probably at least 3 million Afghan refugees.

Israel’s wars in Lebanon have produced many refugees, though most of them are temporary refugees who return home considering most of Israel’s actions were aerial campaigns, or in one case a limited raid. However, many Lebanese would find little solace in this as they have had to flee their homes no less than five times as seen by Israel’s Litani raid in 1978, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the aerial campaigns against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 1993 and 1996 and the 34 day “Second Lebanon War” in 2006. As for figures the Litani operation resulted in at least 100,000 refugees, arguably 300,000 in 1993, a similar number or more in 1996, while it has been suggested perhaps 1 million Lebanese, and even several hundred thousands Israelis, were temporarily displaced by the “Second Lebanon War.” Of course this does not even cover the refugees made by Lebanon’s Civil War or Syria’s subsequent involvement in it. Either way, like Chechnya, the numbers are disproportionate as Lebanon’s population was only 4 million in 2006.

America’s war in Iraq caused millions of refugees. While some of this can be blamed on Sunni-Shiite animosity, Al-Qaeda provocations and excesses, as well as Syrian, Iranian, and even Saudi, support for insurgent, and terrorist groups, in Iraq, America must shoulder much of the blame considering many of her war policies were naive and flawed, and none of this would have happened had she not invaded Iraq. As such perhaps 4 million Iraqis became refugees in their own country, or other ones, during the conflict from 2003-2011. Many hoped that after General Petraeus’s successful counterinsurgency strategy in 2007, and the relative peace and cooperation between Sunnis and Shiites in the next few years, would solve the conflict and help the refugee crisis. However, after the American army withdrew the Shiite dominating government in Iraq succumbed to old habits, oppressed the Sunnis, and thus helped create ISIS, further war and more refugees. Several scholars have suggested that Iraq, by being the Arab country that has the proper mix of sufficient people, oil and water should be leading the Arab World but history has not been kind to her.

Finally, we have the current “Syrian Civil War” which has produced a refugee crisis that has surpassed even Afghanistan at her worst. There are perhaps 10 million Syrian refugees, either internally displaced or currently living in Arab countries, Europe and elsewhere, and this represents close to 50% of Syria’s prewar population! This war cannot be blamed on American machinations, or Israeli aggression. Syria is one of the few Arab states in the region that is not an American client and Israel has generally left Syria alone since 1973 despite the fact the latter has supported every resistance, and terrorist, group against her and arguably sabotaged peace between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and the Palestinians. Henry Kissinger once said “you can’t make war in the Middle East without Egypt and you can’t make peace without Syria.”

Rather President Assad of Syria, and his Alawite, Christian and other minority allies in Syria brought the conflict on themselves by marginalizing the larger Sunni population of Syria, by being even more autocratic, backwards and repressive than most Arab states, and by playing with fire by supporting Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and other fanatical Islamic groups, against American forces and the Iraqis. For these hard core Islamic groups could hardly be considered bedfellows for Assad’s secular regime in Syria which has routinely imprisoned and repressed Islamic groups.

Unsurprisingly these militant factions, especially ISIS, found it easy to piggyback on the legitimate demands made by Syrian protesters in lieu of the “Arab Spring” and eventually found a key role in the resistance after Assad’s predictable crackdown. Either way great power rivalry, along with regional powers interest in the country, the fact that Europe, the UN, and other entities do not want to address the conflict head on, means this conflict will probably drag on for years without end or a satisfactory conclusion.

What can we make of these refugee statistics? Jews in the region were effected just as badly as the Palestinians in 1948-49 at first and there is little recognition of this or the fact that the expulsion of Jews from Arab countries even happened in much of the world. However, the Palestinians have been poorly treated by not only the Israelis who hurt them in 1948, 1967 and even 1982, but by their supposed Arab friends as well who expelled them in 1970 from Jordan, Kuwait after 1991, and even from Libya after the Oslo accords. We should also remember that Israel successfully helped, and integrated, the Jewish refugees after 1948, although admittedly were not so kind to Palestinians under their occupation, whereas the Arab states in all cases kept the Palestinians poor, disenfranchised, and usually in refugee camps to use as political pawns in their real, or fictitious, battles between Israel, America and amongst themselves.

We should also note that the fate of the Pied Noires in Algeria, the Kurds against Turkey and Iraq, and the Chechen refugees have generally been ignored and forgotten versus other conflicts and people. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the “Algerian War” was along time ago and its consequences were limited, that the Kurds did not have the media savvy of the Palestinians or were not as important to major states as Turkey, or sometimes Iraq, or that no one really cared about Russia crushing a former republic that no one knew about. Maybe it was because none of these conflicts involved Israel or America, the usual suspects of blame, or maybe the conflicts themselves had less geopolitical relevance than others in the region, who knows.

Sadly even the aerial campaigns Israel unleashed against Lebanon, which generally resulted in temporary, versus permanent, refugees and killed a fraction of people versus other refugee crises, are by contrast well known, often broached and vehemently condemned (with some justification).

Finally, the numerous conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan have by far produced the worst refugee crises, at least by numbers. In Iraq and Afghanistan much of this can be blamed on Russians and Americans, although it should be noted that both Iraq and Afghanistan had plenty of issues regarding refugees before American interventions in 2001 and 2003. As for Syria the refugee issue is all but the Assad’s regime fault.

By now it should be obvious that nothing in the Middle East, especially war and terrorism, is simple. Americans, and Israelis, are not simple victims of terrorism who have never provoked conflict. Arab States, and Muslim groups, are not innocent actors who have never started wars against others. Russia is not a neutral state with no blood on her hands, and France and Britain had their colonial wars but have been mostly absent from conflict in the region for the past few decades. All of these entities have started wars and conflicts, backed shady groups, killed civilians, produced refugees, and subverted democratic, and liberal movements, to further their own selfish national, or substate, goals. No factions in the Middle East, foreign or domestic, are innocent.

Having said that there are unequivocal trends in the region, which are often forgotten and ignored, as well as countless myths that are perpetrated which do more harm than good. For one thing Arab, and Muslim groups, have killed more of each other than have been killed by Israelis and foreigners. They have also caused more refugees than the latter as well. Whatever wrongs Israel, and foreign countries, have done to Arabs and Muslims, and there are many, there are clearly many problems the Arab and Muslim groups in the region have to address among themselves.

Regarding conventional wars foreign, and Israeli, arms have always triumphed against Arab and Muslim ones (though Jordan fought Israel to a stalemate in 1948 and Egypt had notable victories in 1973). Meanwhile aerial campaigns have produced mixed results; most military goals failing, but sometimes producing political goals in spite of this (aerial power has been more successful when backed by guerrillas or soldiers on the ground). Either way the allure of airpower to policymakers in Israel, and the West, is an illusionary one; it cannot occupy territory, effectively stop rocket attacks, coerce enemies to change policies, let alone defeat armies and insurgents, on its own.

On the other side despite Israeli shortsightedness in policy, American naiveness, and the decadence and incompetence of Arab regimes, the vast majority of insurgent, and terrorist, movements in the region fail, usually decisively (the colonial wars being notable exceptions). Against Chechen rebel victory in the mid-1990s, the collapse of the Soviet client state in Afghanistan during the same period, the PLO’s temporary victory via the OSLO accords, and the Chadian resistance groups against Libya there are dozens, arguably more than a hundred, of examples of failures like all Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda campaigns, most Palestinian and Kurdish efforts, Shiite and Sunni militias in Iraq, ISIS, etc.

However, between outright victories and defeats there are too many instances in the region when the result is not clear cut, or the defeated party can claim victory (or avoiding defeat) due to propaganda or merely surviving. In the case of insurgencies this is less the case because most of them have been brutally suppressed but when we remember that most wars in the region have not led to the overthrow of countries and regimes this makes more sense. None of the “Arab-Israeli Wars” toppled another regime, no aerial campaign broke the enemy side, and American, and foreign, won battles have not resulted in their political goals being realized as much as they would like. As such Nasser, King Hussein and Assad survived Israel’s wars, Hamas, Hezbollah and Saddam survived bombing campaigns, and Arab insurgents have often survived the worst Britain, France, and America, and sometimes Russia, have thrown against them because political, or other circumstances, have intervened.

Finally, we can look at long term goals of the participants, which should be a good gauge considering most wars in the region are limited, and due to the fact that so many of the conflicts are continuations of previous ones. The colonial powers (Britain and France) lost their struggle to dominate their colonies and control the fate of the Middle East without question. Russia failed to uphold her proxy in Afghanistan, ultimately succeeded in reconquering Chechnya, and has hurt America in Syria, yet has never regained the power, and influence, in the region she used to enjoy (having many powers and resistance groups threatening Israel, America and western powers) and if Syria collapsed Russian influence in the region would be marginal. Russia only has Syria as a client state in the region while America has dozens.

While America has been hurt, economically and diplomatically, in the region her long term goals have held: Most Arab states are her clients, Israel is safe, the access to oil fields are open to her, and her friends, and terrorism against America is extremely limited. Israel, who has won most battles, not so many wars, and frankly sucks at winning international opinion, has generally secured her goals as well: Survival, peace or relative peace, few casualties or disruption to her society, etc. Israel has secured herself against conventional threats from her neighbours, and neutralized threats against resistance groups from Gaza and the West Bank. However, Israel still faces a potential long term nuclear threat from Iran, and a direct threat from Hezbollah, who has at least 100,000 rockets in Lebanon. Thus Israel is either the most secure she has ever been, or approaching the most turbulent time in her history.

As for Arab States, Iran, or irregular groups the future is uncertain. Despite the naiveness that outsiders regarded the “Arab Spring” the despots, princes and other leaders in Arab regimes and Iran have held onto power. Resistance groups like ISIS, who are at war with everyone, and other ones that have alienated too many Arabs or enjoy little foreign backing, will probably be crushed or marginalized. Others like Hamas and Hezbollah, who enjoy local, and foreign, backing will probably be around for a long time. Even militia groups like the Sunni, and Shiite, ones in Iraq will not go away so long as Iraq remains a fractured, corrupt, and sectarian divided state. Iran has done a very good job at staying out of wars, while fomenting wars and terrorism abroad, and it is unlikely American, and Israeli, pressure or sanctions will stop her from eventually acquiring nuclear weapons. However, it is anyone’s guess if the theocratic regime in Tehran can remain in power indefinitely given the growing split between those who support the Mullahs and those who want reform and democracy.

Finally, the Arab regimes are often terrible at war, and cannot seem to reform or really build a future for their peoples, but they are remarkably good at staying in power. Tools such as controlling the media, fomenting violence against external threats, blaming every issues on America, Israel or the West, and suggesting that real democracy will only bring violent Islamic zealots to power are but a few of those utilized by Arab regimes to prolong their rotten rule. Besides which America, the West, and often Israel, generally back most of these regimes, openly or tactically, reluctantly or enthusiastically, for a variety of reasons; some of them pragmatic, some naive, and even some that do not make the slightest sense.

One thing is certain. As long as the Middle East is full of backwards nations, fanatical terrorist groups and oil, and as long as America, the West, and Israel care more about their short term interests than helping the Arabs and Muslims help themselves reform politically, culturally and economically, there will be no shortage of conflicts. While it is hard to see the next seventy years being as bloody as the previous seventy it is not impossible.


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