Yes Germany Did Lose “World War 1”

“World War 1” is among the most controversial conflicts of the 20th Century. Regarding causes, prosecution, and legacy there exists no overall consensus in the academic community. The question regarding whether or not Germany was really defeated in the war is one example. Whereas most scholars agree Germany lost decisively there is still a school of thought that questions this. Citing that the German Army was not completely destroyed in 1918, that Entente forces never sat foot on German soil in 1918, and that Germany had massive territorial gains in Eastern Europe, and Russia, at the end of the war this school of thought suggests Germany did not decisively lose the conflict. However, while such claims have some validity there is little doubt given Germany’s desperate straits in 1918, and the fact her leaders were so desperate to accept such an unfavourable armistice, there is no doubt Germany had little chance to continue the war for much longer. For various military, economic, political and other issues, Germany decisively lost “World War 1.”

While apologists of German militarism in “World War 1” tend to point out factors such as those listed above they forget more decisive factors. These include that the German Army was indeed decisively defeated in battle, all of Germany’s allies had surrendered by the end of 1918, the British blockade of Germany severely compromised Germany’s homefront and economy, the German Navy had mutinied, revolutions and uprisings were breaking out across Germany, her leaders like the Kaiser and General Ludendorff had sued for peace and then fled abroad to avoid the consequences of German aggression, and Germany knowingly accepted the armistice terms in 1918 despite its harshness.

Perhaps the biggest myth is that the German Army was never beaten in the field during “World War 1.” The German spring, and summer, offensives in 1918 arguably had a chance to defeat France, and Britain, at key points but by the end of the year the German Army was hanging on by a thread. During the last months of the war the Entente powers on the Western Front launched a series of attacks, known as the “Hundred Days Offensive” which decisively broke the back of the German army. In three months the Entente powers captured approximately 385,000 German prisoners, as well as nearly 6600 artillery pieces, besides inflicting scores of killed and wounded, upon the German Army. These stats are not only significant in themselves, but they illustrate the point that the German Army, like most armies, only suffered such a lopsided amount of prisoners, and artillery pieces, when they were being routed. Such a military phenomenon is confirmed by not only countless military studies, but the great military theorist Clausewitz who noted “guns and prisoners have always counted as the real trophies of victory: they are also its measure, for they are tangible evidence of its scale. They are a better index to the degree of superior morale”, of the enemy army he meant, “than any other factors.”

German losses also include considerable territory, and the overrunning of the vaunted Hindenburg line. While critics of Entente forces point out that German advances during the spring of 1918 took far more land then all Entente offensive on the Western Front since late 1914 to autumn 1917 they forget that not only did the Entente recover the losses from this offensives, but considerable more territory in Belgium and France by the end of the war. Had the Germans not pleaded for an armistice, and the war continued passed November 1918, the Entente would have entered Germany probably sometime in early 1919. Meanwhile the Hindenburg line, which at the time was the greatest defensive line constructed in history, and which the Germans hoped would stop the Entente forces, was breached relatively quickly by the British Army, at which point Germany fell back irrevocably towards the German border. Critics of the Entente point out that the Entente forces never reached German soil in 1918, and that the war on the Western Front was fought in Belgium and France. However, there is no doubt had the war continued the Entente, backed by millions of fresh American soldiers, and thousands of new tanks and airplanes, would have overrun Germany in 1919.

German military losses in 1918 were simply too high for them to continue the war for long. Perhaps most damning is that whereas in the spring of 1918 the Germans outnumbered the Entente on the Western front 192 to 156 divisions by the armistice the Entente forces had almost twice as many soldiers as the German forces who had been decisively routed. As seen by the chart below the Entente rifle strength of their forces started out inferior in early 1918 but dominated the Germans by the end of the war by nearly 2 to 1.

However, German military defeat on the Western Front was only one part of Germany’s overall defeat. Germany also lost all of her allies in late 1918. Of course one could suggest that German allies like the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Turkey and Bulgaria were obviously not in the same league of stronger powers like France, Russia, an America, but whatever their weaknesses Germany’s allies were vital for Germany in many ways. Bulgaria gave the Central Powers (Germany and her allies) the edge in the Balkans and was important in defeating Serbia in 1915, Romania in 1916, containing the Entente forces at Salonica, as well as acting as a bridgeway to Turkey, and the Middle East, for German resources and military power. Turkey distracted considerable Entente forces away from the European battles by adding 3 more fronts to the war (against the Russians in the Caucasus, and the British in the Levant and Palestine; four if you include Gallipoli). Turkish involvement in the war also hampered Russia by closing the Bosporus straits, and preventing Entente material aid from reaching Russia in significant quantities. The Austro-Hungarian Empire, perhaps the most criticized, and least reliable, ally of Germany was still more of an asset for the Central Powers than a liability. She may have been often humiliated, and defeated, by Russian and Serbian forces, but she held down countless of their forces, and this should not be dismissed as there is no way way Germany could have held out against France, Britain and the whole Russian army. Besides which the Austrian army often fought better than is thought, especially when given German support and leadership, and the Austrian force fighting against Italy contained the latter nearly 4 years, inflicting prohibitive costs, despite being severely outnumbered and outgunned.

No German allies would have meant no fighting fronts against Entente forces in the Caucasus, Mesopotamia, the Levant, Galicia and the Carpathians, or the Balkans. It means no Austrian, Bulgarian, and Turkish manpower to fight the war. The Central Powers mobilized approximately 20-22 million soldiers during the war, with Germany providing roughly half of this. It is hard to suggest that losing half of a war alliance’s manpower would not be detrimental to its war effort. It meant that all of the Entente manpower and resources, already at an advantage, could have been brought against Germany. In addition to the forces the Entente powers had to devote to contain Germany’s allies the Entente also often devoted too many others to these fronts, as well in campaigns they hoped would win the war despite the fact it could only be done by defeating Germany. Germany was not propped up by her allies (as Lloyd George thought), her allies were propped up by her; Austria had to be saved from a Russian forces from 1914-16, and Italy in 1917, via infusions of German forces, and Turkey needed German arms, and material, to continue the war. There was simply never a time during the war where Germany needed Austrian, Bulgarian or Turkish forces to save them from defeat; the opposite was the case. It is no coincidence that Germany’s allies collapsed in late 1918 after Germany had focused as much of her armed might on the Western Front as possible, thus denying her allies German resources, especially divisions, to save them from Entente offensives.

Thus in late 1918 when her allies fell one by one Germany’s chances of continuing the war became worse and worse. Bulgaria fell first in late September when the Entente Salonica force finally did something useful and attacked forcefully enough to defeat the Bulgarian army. This had a knock on effect because with Bulgaria collapsing the Entente forces from Salonica could now advance towards Constantinople. Given that British forces had also crushed Turkish forces in the Levant, and Mesopotamia, and Turkey had few soldiers left, meant Turkey had little choice but to surrender. Finally, Austria decisively lost the war in Italy in late October when her army, starving, demoralized and no longer loyal, disintegrated in the face of a strong Italian attack. By early November Germany’s allies were gone. While it is foolish to suggest that British forces in the Middle East, or Entente ones in the Balkans or Italy, posed a direct, or at least, immediate, threat to Germany, and could have invaded her from these areas considering the topographical and logistical factors, the collapse of Germany’s allies meant that all Entente resources would eventually be focused on her, while the morale effect of losing all of ones’ allies could not have been pleasant either.

Then there was the British blockade of Germany. In a predominately land war with trenches, attrition and massive casualties for a few miles, or meters, of gain per offensive the naval war can be forgotten or downplayed. However, the blockade was, eventually, a major factor in German defeat. After the British Empire Germany was the second biggest economy in 1914. Given that naval trade provided a disproportionate amount of resources, revenue and especially food for Germany it is obvious she would suffer eventually when fighting a superior maritime power like Britain. While Britain, and most of her allies, received countless weapons, resources and supplies via naval trade Germany, and her allies, became more denied of all of these, despite overrunning some countries, and territory, and getting some trade from neutrals like Sweden, Holland and Denmark. At the beginning of 1915, German imports had fallen by 55% from pre-war levels. This would only get worse as the British blockade became more effective at limiting neutral shipping, especially American, from reaching Germany.

Besides bland economic considerations a few other factors are worth mentioning. The British blockade of Germany resulted in between 400,000 and 800,000 German civilians deaths during the war. This was potentially more costly than the combined bomber offensive against Germany in “World War 2.” Both are obviously not proud points the Entente, or Allies, talk about but they nevertheless had decisive effects. Besides the potential nearly million German civilian deaths from the blockade has to be added the General starvation, and morale decline, of the German population. During the winter of 1916-17, often referred to by Germans as the “Turnip Winter,” food scarcity was so bad that the German diet consisted mostly of turnips. It also meant German military power would suffer. With fewer resources, money, and weapons, and bad civilian morale German arms suffered. Germany had far less planes, artillery, tanks, trucks and other war assets by 1918 compared to her enemies on the Western Front. Even the German Army’s food situation was terrible by 1918 and this became decisive when during the “German Spring Offensives” in 1918 German soldiers stopped to loot British, and French, food and wine, stores because they had been so deprived of good food and other luxuries. It obviously did not help German soldiers’ morale when their leaders had suggested the British, and French, were suffering just as many privations only to realize this was a lie. On the Entente side none of the major powers suffered such starvation, misery, or desperation even when German submarines were devastating British merchant shipping in 1917.

In the last days of the war the German Navy also mutinied. Told by German leaders to fight the Royal Navy in a do or die fashion the German sailors had had enough and refused. No doubt the already starving, demoralized, sailors were not keen on fighting a Royal Navy that had reformed since Jutland and was now backed by American naval power. The result would have been the unequivocal destruction of the German High Seas Fleet. Instead the German navy first mutinied, then seized Kiel and other cities, and helped spread revolution, and uprisings, across Germany. Such mutiny was unprecedented in German and Prussian military history. Even during the Nazis’ worst excesses, and German defeats, in “World War 2” no sizeable German forces rebelled.

This brought chaos to the German home front as Bavaria declared independence, German workers and soldiers formed soviet style councils which took over many cities, and some German army units mutinied and took control of the Rhine crossings. This helped to bring down the Kaiser, and the militarist government, in Berlin to be followed by a weak civilian government. It should be noted that the Entente refused to negotiate with Germany as long as the Kaiser remained in power.

Therefore the Kaiser was told in no uncertain terms, by his generals no less, that he should abdicate and let the civilians make peace with the Entente. Thus the Kaiser, whose misguided ambitions, and foreign policy, brought the rival British, French and Russian empires into an alliance against Germany, and who did so much to provoke the war, fled Germany and escaped justice. He would be offered asylum in 1940, ironically by Churchill of all people, when the Nazis invaded Holland but refused. Meanwhile Ludendorff, the German army’s de-facto military leader in 1918, and virtual dictator of Germany, also fled to Sweden. It is only fair to note that both of these men wanted unlimited sacrifice from their soldiers, and the German home front, and wanted them to fight to the end, but ultimately fled to save their skin. While no one likes to compare Hitler favourable to anyone at least he stayed in Berlin at the end of the war in 1945.

Such was the state of Germany in November, 1918. Vast amounts of German soldiers, and artillery pieces, being captured, the Germans army went from outnumbering the Entente forces by a significant margin to being outnumbered nearly 2 to 1 itself, all while falling back and losing the greatest amount of territory on the Western Front during the entire war (including the Hindenburg line). Usually when an army surrenders countless soldiers, and artillery, to its enemy, loses numerical superiority quickly after having previously enjoying it, and has to abandon considerable territory, as well as its key defensive line, it is considered a decisive military defeat. Yet the apologists of the German army disagree. Somehow the Germans could have recruited enough German soldiers from a manpower pool that had been bled white to fight, and amass enough military means from a nation starved of money, and resources, due to the British blockade to fight an Entente army that would have had millions of British, French and American soldiers, and 1000s of tanks, planes, and artillery if the war had gone into 1919.

Somehow a country that had been reduced by starvation, and despair, via naval blockade by 1918, which lost all of her allies in the same year, which saw the mutiny of her navy, uprisings and revolution spread across her home front, and the collapse of her unstable monarchy and militaristic government, did not lose the war according to bitter German Generals, and apologists for German militarism ever since. In fact very few countries have suffered such decisive defeats in war as Germany did in “World War 1.” The fact that the German military leaders, despite what they said in their memories and later on, literally begged for an armistice, and accepted its harsh terms, despite leaving Germany defenceless proves this.

The Entente’s armistice terms were devastating, uncompromising and were dictated to the German envoys in early November 1918, who were given no option to negotiate any of the relevant points. Some of the harshest terms included:

Germany had to abandon all occupied territory in France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Alsace-Lorraine within 2 weeks.

The Rhineland was to be demilitarized by the Germans, and Entente forces would occupy bridgeheads on the Rhine itself to occupy part of German territory.

Germany would have to abandon all territory taken from Russia, as well as renounce the unfavourable treaties she had forced upon Russia and Romania. This was a massive blow to the German military elite which naively thought Germany might be able to keep her eastern gains.

The Lion-share of the German fleet would be interned in Entente ports.

The German army would have to hand over 5000 artillery guns (remember it had also already lost nearly 7000 in the last 3 months of the war), 25,000 machine guns and even 2000 warplanes. 5000 trucks, 150,000 rail cars, and 5000 locomotives, would also be given to the Entente.

The Naval Blockade would continue until a peace treaty was signed.

Germany was held responsible for the war and would pay considerable reparations for its cost.

While these terms did not destroy Germany as an independent state, and in the long run did not fatally weaken Germany in terms of territory, resources and population, they did fatally neutralize what was left of German military power in 1918. Hindenburg, what was left of the military elite, as well as the new civilian government in Germany, knew the armistice as presented would leave Germany defenceless. However, given that the Entente would not negotiate any of the terms, and since Germany was tearing itself apart, they had no choice but to accept the armistice and end the war.

Finally, it is not superfluous to remember Clausewitz’s famous maxim that “war is nothing but a continuation of politics by other means.” War is fought for political goals and the attainment, or denial, of such goals are a big part in determining which side wins. Of the Entente side Britain, France, America and Italy generally accomplished their war aims, albeit often at terrible human and financial cost. Britain prevented the English channel ports from falling into enemy hands, effectively guaranteed Belgium’s freedom, neutralized the growing threat of German naval power, and maintained the balance of power in Europe. France liberated the territory Germany took in 1914, regained Alsace-Lorraine, avenged the “Franco-Prussian War,” and replaced Germany as the strongest military power in Europe until 1940. America’s goals of a Wilsonian peace that would bring a more free, and fair, world obviously did not bear fruit but given that America replaced Britain as the foremost financial power during the war, and given American rising clout in international opinion meant that America gained the most from the war with hindsight. Italy effectively annexed the Italian speaking territories she coveted from Austria, and saw the dismemberment of her Austrian enemy’s empire, but was frustrated in other areas by British and French false promises. It is worth mentioning that Russia did not have a good war, lost more men, and territory, that any other power, suffered revolution and the beginning of communism that would plagued her for decades. However, Russian despair did not compensate for Germany, or her allies, failures.

What about the political goals of the Central Powers?

Bulgaria, who joined the war to avenge losses in the “Second Balkan war,” take territory in the Balkans, and become that region’s greatest power, had nothing to show in the end for her efforts but considerable losses of men, and territory, which were disproportionately detrimental for a small power like herself. Turkey’s ambitions to stop the decline of the Ottoman Empire, and acquire land against Russia in the Caucasus, and the British in the Middle East were also effectively quashed. Britain conquered the Levant (Palestine, Lebanon and Syria) as well as Mesopotamia (modern day Iraq), the Ottoman Empire surrendered in October 1918 and her capital was invested by Entente troops, and any territory the Turks gained against Russia had to be evacuated after the war. The Austrian-Hungarian Empire, perhaps the country most responsible for starting the war, even more than Germany, was effectively destroyed by the conflict. Unable to defeat either Russia, or Serbia, the Austrians relied on Germany to prop them up constantly throughout the war. Ironically by the Spring of 1918 it seemed as though Austria’s political goals had been accomplished; Serbia had been conquered, Russia stymied and kicked out of the war, and Italy beaten back and contained. However, a few months later the Austrian army collapsed, her various peoples’ had rebelled, or declared independence, and what remained of Austria after 1919 was a small country of little geopolitical significance.

What of German political aims and results? While on one hand it is debatable what the German political, and military, elite wanted to accomplish, on the other hand it is easy enough to determine their basic goals. This included Preemption against Russian military, and economic, power that they felt would become unassailable in the near future. It also included either reducing France to a vassal state, or at least to an insignificant military threat against her, backing up Austria against Serbia, and potentially Russia in 1914. Certainly German war aims included breaking out of the real, or imagined, German view of being encircled by hostile powers all around her, as well as not only remaining the strongest power in Europe, but effectively dominating the continent.

To be fair Germany accomplished her goal against Russia; while the latter had been growing stronger each year the war stopped this and by 1917 Russia’s economy was in shambles, her military scattered and routed, her political system overturned, and much of her territory and population overran and occupied. This set back Russia years, maybe decades, and it would take until the 1940s for her to pose a real threat to Germany again. However, Germany failed miserably in her other goals. French independence, and military power, was not crushed, the Austrian Empire was destroyed, Germany not only failed to break out of her encirclement but lost her military power and suffered Entente occupation of the Rhineland. Needless to say Germany was not only not the strongest power in Europe by 1919 but far from dominating it. The Entente powers more or less accomplished their political aims of the war, but Germany and her allies unequivocally failed to accomplish theirs.

Germany lost “World War 1” decisively. In terms of military, political, economic, and morale, she lost in every regard. Germany’s Army was beaten, her allies deserted her, the German people became starved, hopeless and engaged in revolt, her navy mutinied and even her strongest leaders, the Kaiser and Ludendorff, fled abroad at the end of the conflict while her war aims clearly failed. Germany was not stabbed in the back by a weak kneed Homefront in 1918 with her army undefeated. In fact the army had been so defeated by the autumn of 1918 that her leaders, including Ludendorff, panicked and suggested an armistice to protect Germany before she was overrun. Germany’s military leadership, and the Kaiser, fled, and willingly gave over power, to a novice, and hesitant civilian government, that had to make peace with the Entente. In no way did the civlilian leadership in Germany challenge, or coerce, the militarists to sue for peace, the exact opposite is true. Germany lost the “World War 1” according to every measure of warfare.

Bibliography

Hart, Peter. The Great War: A Combat History of the First World War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Keegan, John. The First World War. Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2000.

Neillands, Robin.  The Great War Generals on the Western Front 1914-18.  London:  Robinson Publishing, 1999.

Philpott, William. War of Attrition: Fighting the First World War. New York: Overlook Press, 2014.

Prior, Robin and Trevor Wilson.  The First World War.  London:  Cassell, 1999.

Sheffield, Gary and John Bourne.  Douglas Haig:  War Diaries and Letters.  London:  Phoenix, 2005.

Sheffield, Gary.  Forgotten Victory.  London:  Headline Book Publishing, 2001.

Strohn, Matthias. World War 1 Companion. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2013.

Terraine, John. The Great War. London: Wordsworth Editions, 1999.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


Share article on

Conflict in the Middle East Since 1945

Since 1945 the Middle East has arguably been the most volatile region on earth. It has seen more wars, insurgencies, terrorism, and other violent unpleasantries, than anywhere else. However, despite of this, conflict in the region is often misunderstood, or generalized, by people across the world. Biased and one-sided condemnations of European imperialism, American and Russian meddling, Israeli actions and Palestinian and Arab intransigence are typical, and often ignore the complex historical, cultural, economic and sectarian issues in the region. War in the Middle East is anything but simple but there are plenty of trends if one looks closely.

When looking at conflicts in the Middle East it should be noted they are often hard to define considering how varied they can be. Looking at a sample of approximately 50 conflicts in the Middle East Since 1945 the following can be stated. Four of them were colonial wars by France and Britain. Seventeen, as in 1/3rd involved Israel, ten involved the Palestinians, 4 involved the Russians, and 8 involved the Americans. Nine of the wars were mostly conventional wars (armies fighting armies), eleven were generally aerial campaigns conducted by the America, Russia or Israel, and the remaining were mostly asymmetrical conflicts regarding civil wars, insurgencies, or terrorist movements trying to change the status quo. The reason for the qualification of “mostly” in these categories is that much of these conflicts were hybrid conflicts involving aspects of conventional, airpower and asymmetrical warfare. For example, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 involved not only fighting the PLO resistance group but also the Syrian army. Likewise, America’s aerial campaign in Libya in 2011 was coordinated with Libyan resistance movements against Gaddafi’s regime. Needless to say much of these wars overlap with each other.

So what were these wars? The colonial conflicts were Britain’s war to secure Aden, her doomed attempt to keep Palestine after 1945, the combined Franco-British Suez conflict to subvert Egypt in 1956 (also supported by Israel), and France’s dirty war in Algeria.

Israel’s seventeen wars include the six “Arab-Israeli wars,” numerous aerial campaigns, and several asymmetrical conflicts against the PLO, Hamas, and Hezbollah. The Palestinians had ten wars, under many guises such as the PLO, Hamas, and/or other groups, eight of which were against Israel as well as involvement with the Jordanian and Lebanese civil wars.

Russia’s wars include their support for Syria during the never ending “Syrian Civil War,” the “Soviet-Afghan War” as well as the two Chechen Wars if we include these as part of Middle Eastern conflict (Chechnya technically being part of Europe). America’s eight wars include a UN mission in Somalia, the liberation of Kuwait, “Operation Desert Fox,” the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and aerial campaigns in Libya and Syria (and perhaps Kosovo even if it is outside the Middle East).

Finally, there are the asymmetrical conflicts (many, if not all, of which overlap with previously stated conflicts) regarding civil wars, insurgencies and terrorist movements. These include at least seven civil wars; Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Oman, Libya and Afghanistan; Kurdish insurgencies against Turkey and Iraq, Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda and ISIS conflicts in the region, and other resistance and/or terrorist movements in the region. This list is far from being exhaustive as there were probably dozens of more conflicts in the region during the same timeframe.

From this we can see a few trends. Nine of the conflicts (less than 20%) were predominately stand up conventional fights (5 of Israel’s wars, the “Gulf War,” the “Iran-Iraq War,” the short war between Jordan and Syria in 1970, and the limited war between Egypt and Libya in 1977. Meanwhile the predominantly aerial campaigns involved American efforts in Kosovo, Libya, Syria and Iraq, Russia’s late efforts in Syria, 3 Israeli actions against Hezbollah in Lebanon, and another 3 against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. As already noted the rest are various types of asymmetrical conflicts.

Furthermore we can divide the conflicts between wars involving foreign states (Russia, America, European), Israel, and those waged between Arab and Muslim states/groups. One third of the conflicts involve Israel, foreign states are involved in another third, while inter-regional (not including Israel or outsiders) involves at least 30, or perhaps much more, if you include low grade fighting against Arab and Muslim nations and groups.

What about results, who won these wars? Unfortunately victory and defeat in the Middle East is controversial, not only if we separate military success from political, or even propaganda coups, but also because few wars in the region have involved the complete defeat, or overthrow, of nations or often even resistance groups. Meanwhile the tendencies of Arab states, and resistance groups, claiming victory just because they survive, and the fact that long term results of these conflicts are often mixed further complicates easy determinations of victory and defeat. However, on one hand it is easy to say who has won according to pure military and political terms. Often armies, resistance groups, and terrorist movements has been so smashed that no objective analyst would debate the military result. However, as Clausewitz noted “war is a continuation of politics by other means” and given the usual relatively limited nature of war in the Middle East a nation, or non-state entity, can claim victory if their political goals were accomplished. The third, perhaps most laughable, claim of victory is propaganda victories by nations or groups which claim survival as victory. To make things even more confusing the weird circumstance of the region can result in several sides claiming victory. All of this will be addressed below.

Unsurprisingly military victories are the easiest to show. It is hard for one side to claim they won the battle after a humiliating retreat, losing most of their tanks and planes, and their capital is threatened. In all conventional wars there has been an obvious winner in military terms. Israel decisively beat the Arab armies in all but one or two stand up fights, America dominated the “Gulf War,” Egypt beat Libya and Jordan beat Syria in their respective wars, and even Iraq thoroughly smashed Iran’s army at the end of the “Iran-Iraq War.” The same goes regarding asymmetrical conflicts in general; most insurgent or terrorist groups losing the military struggle. Meanwhile with perhaps one or two exceptions as in Afghanistan in the early 1990s no resistance, or terrorist movement, came to power in the region by physically defeating government forces or overthrowing regimes (at least not without considerable conventional or airpower backing by foreign states). Generally they have been crushed brutally as the Kurdish and Muslim brotherhood insurgencies, or other resistance groups, via harsh Arab despots.

Even in the colonial wars the hated imperialists were never physically defeated but forced to withdraw due to public opinion and political considerations at home. However, in rare cases an army can suffer military defeat at the hands of guerrillas such as during Russia’s first war against Chechnya. In this conflict two of Russia’s columns were mauled during the initial assault on Grozny, she suffered countless ambushes against her convoys, she failed to resolve the “Budyonnovsk hospital hostage crisis,” and even had her forces trapped and humiliated by Chechen rebels in Grozny at the end of the war. Libya was also ultimately defeated by a guerrilla army of Toyota trucks with anti-tank weapons at the end of the “Chadian-Libyan Conflict.”

Aerial campaigns are more controversial regarding military results considering not only have they usually been against mobile, and lightly armed, guerrillas and terrorists that are hard to track and kill from the air, but that the campaigns themselves have often targeted political will and non-military targets. America’s air efforts are mixed; in Kosovo the Serbian army was not seriously hurt, the operation against Iraq in 1998 was perhaps a half victory in degrading Saddam’s capabilities, her air campaign in Syria hurt ISIS but did not effectively protect her rebel allies on the ground from the Assad Regime or Russia, but her support of the rebels in Libya in 2011 was an unequivocal success regarding the overthrow of Gaddafi by degrading his armed forces. Perhaps Russia’s air campaign in Syria by contrast was exceedingly successful, supporting Assad’s forces while hurting ISIS and punishing America’s allies on the ground. Meanwhile Israel arguably produced poor military results in her three aerial campaigns against Hizbollah in Lebanon but did relatively better in her three against Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

However military results, especially in limited war and conflicts regarding insurgency and terrorism, are not always decisive and in these cases political considerations are often more important. Whatever impressive military victories America, Israel, Russia and the colonial Powers have accomplished against armies, and insurgents, their political results have rarely proven as beneficial. Israel won every conventional clash against states and armies but only one of them, against Egypt in 1973, resulted in a peace treaty (ironic considering this was the only war Egypt rebuffed Israel several times in battle). Of course Israel won her statehood in 1948, and bought a decade of tranquillity against Egypt after 1956, yet her greatest victory in 1967 burdened her with hostile Palestinian territory in Gaza, and the West Bank, and led to terrible the “War of Attrition,” and later the “Yom Kippur War,” which were more bloody, and demoralizing, for Israel than anything before or since.

Israel’s record in aerial campaigns is also mixed: Unsurprisingly with the considerable anti-Israeli sentiment in the UN, and international opinion, and the fact Israel is now seen as Goliath and the Palestinians as David, Israel has rarely won the battle of public opinion in most of these struggles. Yet in 4 out of 6 of her aerial assaults Israel can claim political victory (oddly enough even in 2006 during perhaps Israel’s worst showing in any conflict). Israel has managed to gain relative peace in the south against Hamas’s rocket, and other attacks, and has not had to end her blockade, recognize Hamas or concede any notable concession to the resistance group. Against Hezbollah Israel’s air campaigns in the 1990s accomplished little political gains but the 2006 campaign, whatever its many failings, seems to have deterred Hezbollah from provoking Israel and the latter has enjoyed over a decade of relative quiet in the north thus far.

America secured her political goals in the “Gulf War,” which was liberating Kuwait at small cost and not overthrowing Saddam Hussein (which was never seriously considered at the time). Regarding two of her air campaigns, Kosovo and Libya the Americans secured their political objectives outright (even if her aerial campaign against Serbia was relatively inept), but her other two against Syria and Iraq can be seen as relative political failures since neither Saddam’s Iraq, or ISIS and Assad’s regime, were decisively defeated, or forced to change their detrimental regional policies. America’s war in Somalia resulted in a political defeat when Bill Clinton pulled its forces out of the country after the “Battle of Mogadishu” in 1993 where the American forces scored a notable tactical victory in killing hundreds of militants but lost 19 servicemen, some of the latter who were dragged through the streets live on TV which obviously shocked America.

Finally, there are the ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In one sense America secured many of her political goals by overthrowing Saddam Hussein and the Taliban, ultimately weakening Al-Qaeda, and installing nascent democracies in these countries. However, the price has been too high regarding American soldiers, the cost to American credibility and prestige, not to mention her finances, and especially regarding the civilian losses in Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile the budding democracies in these countries have not so far proven to be effective at surviving on their own, or preventing the rise of ISIS or the resurgence of other terrorist groups.

Russia has secured her political goals in two of her wars; in the “Second Chechen War” she finally subjugated Chechnya (though it took ten years and terrific casualties) as well as her intervention in Syria which safeguarded Assad’s regime, and weakened both ISIS and America’s Syrian resistance allies. However, Russia withdrew in humiliation after failing to conquer Chechnya in the “First Chechen War” and ultimately her 10 year war in Afghanistan was a failure considering the Mujaheddin were never contained, or defeated, and Russia’s client state in Kabul later fell to the resistance fighters.

Britain and France failed politically in their wars despite often impressive military results. Obviously colonialism was discredited, and dying, after “World War 2,” with ironically the Americans, the Soviet Union and the UN all being united against European imperialism. Meanwhile the colonial powers were weakened in the post war period, and their populaces in no mood to fight conflicts that had little moral or international support. Finally, given that there was almost zero support from the indigenous people for the colonial powers that were occupying their country we see there was no political legitimacy at all for these conflicts. While there were diehards in the political, and military, establishments in London and Paris, there was no international support, little public support, and no indigenous support, for colonial wars.

Looking from the other side we see that resistance groups, and Arab states, have accomplished their political goals much of the time. In the case of the colonial wars public opinion in Britain and France, superpower pressure, and the sheer cost of war have handed victory to the underdogs despite the fact the latter never accomplished significant military reverses on their enemies. Russia has had to admit political defeat in Chechnya (in the first conflict), America withdrew from Somalia, while whatever gains both nations accomplished in Chechnya, Iraq or Afghanistan can probably be described as “pyrrhic victories,” despite not losing in the field.

In Israel’s case she has survived all existential threats but the Palestinians scored a notable victory due to the “First Intifada” via the ensuing the Oslo Accords, while Israel’s 1982 overwhelming victory against Syria in the Bekaa valley, and the PLO in Beirut, ultimately made things worse with the subsequent rise of Hezbollah. Eventually Israel tired so much of the conflict in Southern Lebanon against Hezbollah that she withdrew from Lebanon altogether (which has to be seen as a propaganda victory for Hezbollah at best or a political one at worst).

Meanwhile the Arab states are not proficient at military victory in conventional warfare but they have rarely failed to beat insurgents and terrorists (perhaps partly because they are not as constrained by brutal means, or media considerations like Israel or western democracies are). There is no way Israelis, or Americans, would have been permitted to carpet bomb a city like the Russians did in Grozny, to use gas like the Egyptians in Yemen or the Iraqis against the Kurds, to massacre 30,000 civilians indiscriminately like the Syrians did in Hama in 1982 or to shell Palestinian refugee camps mercilessly as the Jordanians and Syrians did in the 1970s.

Besides outright political victory Arab regimes, and resistance groups, can still be seen as relatively successful when using propaganda to claim they have won conflicts by merely surviving. This should not be dismissed because in general Arab states, and resistance groups, have been far more adept at using propaganda in the Middle East then the well meaning, if naive Americans, and the tactically minded and short term focused Israelis. Israel, and America, are liberal democracies with a relatively free media and much of it is often ran by elements unfavourable to their war efforts whereas the Arab states and resistance groups (and Russia), being non-democratic and far from Liberal, can dominate media and public opinion. Therefore while the military strength of Arab armies, guerrilla and terrorist forces can be beaten by their enemies the former can easily manipulate the media.

Therefore the Arabs claim America did not defeat Saddam Hussein in 1991 but was stopped from taking Iraq. Meanwhile Israel may have taken a lot of Arab territory in 1967 but Cairo, Amman, and Damascus was saved from Zionist occupation. It did not matter if the PLO was kicked out of Jordan in 1970, exiled from Lebanon in 1982 and forced to Tunisia, it still survived. According to Arab propaganda in the Middle East their states, and resistance groups, have won every battle despite the fact Israel is a thriving democracy, America is still present in the Middle East, the Arab states are collapsing, or on the brink or anarchy, or that most of the people in the Middle East are still poor, oppressed, and disenfranchised.

Then there is the odd point that such limited, and unpredictable, warfare in the region can even allow several sides to claim victory. Besides the aforementioned illusions there are plenty of incidents were several sides have actually legitimately won. The “Arab-Israeli wars” are illustrative. Israel survived and beat back the Arab armies in the first conflict but Jordan took the West Bank while even a weakened Egyptian retained the Gaza Strip. In 1956 Israel beat Egypt in the Sinai but Egypt accomplished a decisive political coup in surviving the British, and French, attempt to subjugate her. In 1973 Israel pushed back the Syrians close to Damascus, and crossed the Suez Canal to surround an entire Egyptian army, but there is no doubt that Egypt won the political battle by humiliating the Israeli army in the first few days of the war and allowing Sadat to bring Israel to the peace table. Israel’s lopsided military victory in 1982 destroyed the PLO in Lebanon but Syria was the ultimate beneficiary in the long run. This is not limited to nations as Hezbollah may have had to pull back from the Lebanon border after 2006 but she now has more rockets (in fact ten fold), and is in a vastly superior position ten years later. Meanwhile Israel’s efforts to stop the “First Intifada” were successful overall but the PLO could be satisfied by the results of the Oslo accords.

However, it is one thing to claim political and/or military kudos in limited wars, quite another whether or not it accomplishes nations’, or resistance groups’, long term goals. For it is obvious that since there are so many conflicts, often continuations of previous ones, that few wars in the region have produced overwhelming, longterm, decisive results. The colonial wars were decisive given that it forever broke the power of Britain, and France, to manipulate the region. Perhaps the “Arab-Israelis Wars” can be seen as decisive, at least in military means: Not only has Israel survived in the region, but no nation (s) can realistically threaten her with conventional military power, and since 1982 all of her threats have been from terrorism, and resistance groups. As such of Israel’s two major long term goals; survival and peace she has secured the former completely. However, regarding peace Israel’s wars have only had limited success. Egypt and Jordan have peace treaties with Israel but otherwise the Arab states, and resistance groups, are still hostile at best, or cold and indifferent at worse.

America gets a lot of censure for her wars in the region but realistically the majority of her long term goals have been secured so far. Israel has survived, America’s military presence in the region is still strong, most of the Arab states are de-facto (if unenthusiastic) American allies, and the access to most of the oil in the region is still open to America, Europe and her allies. American rivals like China and Russia have limited influence in the region, compared to America at least, while her enemies in the region like Iran, Syria, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS are often nuisances, and pose some threats, but are generally contained and mostly in their decline. Meanwhile despite small pinprick successes few terrorist plots have succeeded, let alone killed a lot of Americans, on mainland America since 9/11 and thus technically she is winning the “war on terror.”

However, in two areas American goals have failed. Despite decades of efforts America has never solved the “Israeli-Palestine” conflict which remains a constant source of bitterness, and anger, in the region. Additionally, George Bush Junior’s plan to create a vibrant and stable democracy in Iraq, which would hopefully lead to more Liberalism, and freedom in the region, has also unravelled as seen by the chaos in Iraq, and the dashed hopes of the “Arab Spring.”

Russia gets some points for besting American interests in Syria, bullying Turkey, and her eventual conquest of Chechnya, but realistically these victories are more for show and generally hollow. Given how much power the Soviet Union had in the region at her height Russia’s position there today is very limited. Whereas Russia’s client states used to include Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria now only Syria remains an ally while the others, along with the vast majority of the nations of the Middle East are in America’s camp. The same goes for resistance groups; the PLO, and other Palestinian and terrorist groups, in the region, and Europe, used to be allied with the Russians but now they are either quashed, contained, switched sides or dominated by countries like Iran and Syria. The major oilfields are in countries allied to America, Russian power in most Arab countries is weak, and the prospect of Russia gaining more influence at America’s expense in the region is unfavourable for the foreseeable future.

What about the Arab States, Iran, and resistance groups? In the case of survival, most regimes have admittedly survived wars stand up wars, and insurgencies, trying to overthrow them (Iraq and Afghanistan being notable exceptions). However, their efforts to conquer other territories, or expand their ideologies, have usually been failures: Saddam never kept any Iranian territory and was pushed out of Kuwait, Libya failed to take Chad, Syria ultimately had to withdrew from Lebanon, and the physical borders of the region have barely changed since the postwar period. Meanwhile Nasser’s Pan-Arabism, the Baathist ideology of Iraq and Iran’s fundamentalist template have not successfully transformed the region. Generally the individual Arab states are American client states whether they like it or not and have little power, or even motivation, to challenge America, or Israel’s, main interests in the region.

Perhaps theocratic Iran has done the best to spread her influence and flout America and Israel. She has considerable support, and even militants, in Lebanon and Iraq, and propped up Syria, Hamas and Hizbollah which give terrible head aches to America and Israel. Meanwhile her quest for nuclear weapons has the potential to make her untouchable and give her more regional influence. Yet Iran’s aging theocrats are becoming more out of touch with the Iranian people, more fissures are developing between moderated and fanatics in the regime, western sanctions are eroding Iran’s economy and as such Iran’s future of presenting a major counter-balance to America is far from certain.

Most resistance groups have either been crushed, contained or lost their legitimacy, yet a few of them like Hamas, Hezbollah, and maybe for awhile ISIS are still significant. Hamas cannot expand much but it still has enough foreign connections, and support of the people, to survive almost indefinitely. Hezbollah is still very strong, controls much of Lebanon and enjoys unlimited support from Syria and Iran. It also has more than 100,000 rockets pointed at Israel and is probably the latter’s biggest threat. ISIS still has shock value and seen as a major enemy but its power will probably continue to degrade considering all Arab states, their masses, and the rest of the world is against it (even most hardcore Islamists and terrorist groups think ISIS has gone too far). The Palestinian movement it should be stressed, is no closer to destroying Israel, let alone gaining any notable territory or concessions, after nearly 70 years of conflict. The Kurds, with the exception of northern Iraq, have also failed in their attempts at statehood, the Muslim Brotherhood came to power in Egypt only briefly, and Al-Qaeda’s vision of establishing a caliphate from Morocco to the Gulf is a mirage.

What has been the cost in blood, and refugees, since 1945 in the Middle East? Unfortunately stats regarding war deaths in the region are often unreliable for various reasons. Some of this is due to poor documentation, but also because Arab nations, and resistance groups, do not record their deaths as accurately as westerners and Israelis, partially due to the fact the latter are more casualty sensitive, and partially due to the less organized nature of the former. Meanwhile most belligerents have political, or propaganda, reasons to exaggerate, or downplay casualties. Obviously all sides want to maximize the number of enemy combatants killed, be it Western or Arab soldiers, or resistance personal.

Civilian losses are another matter; obviously Arab states threatened by foreigners and Israel, will exaggerate losses while the latter want to minimize them. Resistance groups will also maximize these no matter who they are fighting. On another level occupiers or armies; Israeli, Americans, Russians, Arabs, etc, will try to exaggerate how many civilians died via resistance, or terror groups, and minimize how many were killed by their own forces.

Then there is the bias of authors who are either too pro-West, Israeli, Arab, Russia, etc, that cherry pick statistics to support their cases. The point being that it is unsurprising that in a region where nothing is certain, and everything is controversial, that there is often no authoritative estimate for casualties. For example estimates of the “Algerian War” put the death toll between 300,000 to 1 million, the “Gulf War” between 10,000 and 100,000, the “Iran-Iraq War” between several hundred thousand and perhaps 1 million, the “Iraq War” from 200,000 to 1 million and the “Soviet-Afghan War” from 500,000 to 2 million. No doubt the maxim regarding the 3 kinds of lies is very relevant for conflict in the Middle East. Thus the author does not pretend all of the statistics he has written are accurate but he has done his best to make educated guesses based on common sense while rejecting the more absurd estimates.

Some of the bloodier wars include the “Iran-Iraq War,” which resulted in at least 400,000 deaths, the “Soviet-Afghan War” which resulted in at least 1 million, the ongoing “Syrian Civil War” which has so far cost 400,000, the French war in Algeria that cost at least 300,000, the “Lebanese Civil War” with 150,000 dead and America’s recent war in Afghanistan which has probably had 100,000 deaths at least. The “Arab-Israeli Wars” by contrast have been relatively tame with most of them costing close to 20,000 dead while the intifadas, Israel’s aerial campaigns, and her smaller wars have all cost less than 5000, most costing under 2000 lives. Russian, and American, aerial campaigns have also not been overly bloody despite the considerable controversy and moral outrage sparked by them, with generally a few thousand deaths.

Other relatively bloody conflicts include the two Russian wars in Chechnya (together costing probably more than 50,000), the “Gulf War,” with its approximately 20,000 deaths, the “Algerian Civil War” with probably at least 100,000, the Kurdish insurgencies in Turkey and Iraq which resulted in at least 100,000-250,000 and the Islamist uprising, mostly the Muslim Brotherhood, in Syria which arguably resulted in 40,000 dead.

After this, at least regarding the examples we have looked at, the death tolls are not so high as they are the result of smaller civil wars, aerial campaigns, or more manageable insurgencies and terrorist campaigns. Most of the aerial campaigns have not killed over a few thousand (soldiers and civilians) and this is also the case with many civil war like those in Oman, or Jordan, as well as most Al-Qaeda (Iraq and Afghanistan being significant exceptions) and Muslim brotherhood insurgencies.

What trends can we deduce from these butcher bills? Perhaps the first is despite the inherent anti-Semitism in the Arab World, along with international opinion being mostly against Israel regarding Middle Eastern issues, is that Israel’s wars, despite their frequency and controversy, has killed a relatively low amount of people killed in the wars in the region for the past 7 decades. Statistics can always be argued over but all of Israel’s wars, aerial adventures, and anti-terrorist campaigns have probably not killed over 150,000 (which is still significant though well short of many wars in the region). Many wars by themselves have killed not only as much, but often several times more (French War in Algeria, the Lebanese, Syrian and Algerian Civil Wars, the war in Iraq, the “Soviet-Afghan War,” and the “Iran-Iraq War).” Furthermore it would be unfair to blame Israel for the outbreak of all of these wars, as well as all the deaths as many of these conflicts were provoked or initiated from the other side (1948, 1967, 1973, 2000) or involved inter-Arab killings which were hardIy Israel’s fault.

Then there is America, who the Ayatollah called the “Greater Satan,” Israel being the “Little Satan.” Five of America’s wars, 4 aerial campaigns and her part in the UN mission in Somalia, did not result in a disproportionate amount of deaths, while the “Gulf War” cost at least 20,000 and her Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan tragically more (probably at least 200-300,000 in Iraq and 100,000 in Afghanistan). However, these wars cannot be compared to France’s dirty war in Algeria, Russia’s near genocidal treatment of Afghanistan and Chechnya, nor the World War 1 style of carnage in the “Iran-Iraq War.” No doubt the wars to liberate Kuwait, and respond to 9/11 by going into Afghanistan, were justified (Saddam invaded Kuwait and Al-Qaeda attacked America unprovoked) but the “Iraq War” was clearly unnecessary, and unjustified. However, even in Iraq and Afghanistan it is arguable that the inhabitants killed more of each other than America killed of them. Few people like blackwater, and corporate armies, but American forces did not have death squads like the Sunni and Shiite militias in Iraq, and were not as blood thirsty and unforgiving as Al-Qaeda in both countries.

Whatever her flaws, and naiveness, America legitimately wanted to created democracy, and freedom, in these countries and wanted to safeguard the rights of marginalized groups (be it Sunni, Shiite and Kurds) whereas most of their enemies would rather have had sectarian, authoritative and Islamic fanatical regimes. However, as the saying goes, “the road to hell is paved with good intentions,” and American wars in the Middle East since 2001, while not damaging American long term goals overall, has certainly killed too many people, lost most of the Arab and Muslim populations of the region’s confidence, and damaged her reputation both at home and abroad.

We also have the europeans’ part in these wars; France, Britain and Russia. Ironically Britain, the most powerful colonial power in the world, which not only had the most possessions in the region, but also held the most influence there even before the 20th century until the war in 1956, killed the least amount of people in these conflicts than her fellow europeans, America, Israel and certainly Arabs and others since 1945. Britain’s wars in Aden and Egypt were relatively small, and cheap, affairs versus other struggles while her conduct in Palestine against the Jewish insurgents after WW2 was constrained by international opinion and the fact it was politically unacceptable to be harsh against a people of which many of whom had just survived Nazi concentration camps. As such the cost of these wars were relatively small; 2000 killed in Aden, less than 5000 killed in the “Suez Crisis” and a marginal number fighting the Jewish insurgents in Palestine.

France was only involved directly in two of these conflicts, Suez and Algeria, and indirectly in one, Libya’s wars against Chad, but her dirty war in Algeria had a disproportionate effect in blood and politics. While France’s conduct in Algeria was perhaps not as bad as the worst Arab regimes, one thinks of Saddam against the Kurds and Assad against Hama in 1982, it was worse than American, Israeli and British excesses in their wars. The indiscriminate bombing of cities, widespread practice of torture, summary executions, the use of concentration camps, the insubordination of military leaders and factions that not only defied political authority, but actively tried to overthrow it, were commonplace in France’s war in Algeria but thankfully absent, or at least diminished, in other democratic countries’ conflicts in the region. France, unsurprisingly with these means, crushed the rebellion in Algeria, though not the rebel forces across the border, and certainly did not win the political battle for world opinion, in Algeria and ultimately even among the French people. Not only did France lose her legitimacy to stay in Algeria, but French military leaders in Algeria rebelled against the politicians and even threatened to overthrow the French government leading Charles De Gaulle no choice but to abandon Algeria to prevent a potential civil war in France!

Meanwhile Russia, which has generally escaped the visceral criticism aimed at foreign nations who have waged war in the Middle East, has probably killed more Arabs and Muslims then Britain, France, America and Israel combined. In the “Soviet-Afghan war” alone at least 1 million, some say 2 million, were killed. Russian conduct here was just as bad as the French in Algeria and mass indiscriminate bombing, torture, reprisals and atrocities against civilians were widespread and uncompromising. The same goes for Chechnya in two wars where Grozny was more or less carpet bombed twice and perhaps 50,000 Chechens (in a population barely over a million) were killed. None of this saved the Soviet Client in Kabul or brought prosperity, and democracy, to Chechnya.

Finally, we come to the Arabs, Palestinians, Iranians and other indigenous factions (stage or substate). These states, or groups, are often cast as the victims of imperialist, American and Israeli designs (which unfortunately has too often been true) while their own self serving actions and crimes have usually been dismissed in popular media. While much of the “Arab-Israeli Wars” and Israel’s conflicts, can be blamed on Israel much can also be blamed on the Arabs and Palestinians. Obviously in the case of the colonial, and Russia’s, wars, the Arabs and indigenous people are innocent, but in the case of America’s interventions the record is mixed again. American interventions in Kosovo, Libya, and Somalia were humanitarian missions, Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda were unequivocally the aggressors regarding the “Gulf War” and 9/11, yet the “Iraq War” was unprovoked and a mistake, while her bombing campaigns against Iraq in the 90s, and the current one in Syria, are controversial regarding motives and potential results. Yet the majority of the conflicts in the region have been inter-Arab, and Muslim, conflicts where foreign, and Israeli, influence is a secondary factor or non-existent.

How does this relate to bloodletting in the region. As stated above it is unfair to blame all deaths in Israeli, American and foreign wars on the the former and say the indigenous forces deserve no blame but it is also obvious that the latter cannot be totally held accountable for the same in their conflicts (which maddeningly enough overlaps with the formers’ wars too often). However, a share in the Arab-Israeli wars, the fact many foreign wars were provoked by Arab states or terror groups, realizing that most civil wars in the region are domestic, and not foreign problems, and remembering that most terrorist elements are also in this category, means that Arabs and Muslims have too many conflicts and problems where they cannot outsource blame.

Let us assume half blame for the “Arab-Israeli Wars” on the Arab side (the Arab states were not provoked by Israel in 1948, certainly provoked Israel in 1967, and bare some partial blame for other conflicts). Meanwhile let us blame half of the conflicts over Lebanon, West Bank and Gaza on them as well since Israel has either withdrawn from these territories at some point to try peace or has been occasionally attacked from them as well. Surely Israel’s policies, and occupations, have not been stellar but Hezbollah could have made peace after Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, Hamas could have tried peace overtures after Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005, and the Palestinian authority could have tried harder for peace in the 1990s instead of allowing militant groups to keep attacking Israel. This gives us 60,000 or more deaths for the Arabs here alone.

What about pure indigenous wars and conflicts? The “Iran-Iraq War,” civil wars in Algeria, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, Oman and Afghanistan, Kurdish, Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda and other insurgencies and terrorist campaigns are too numerous to count. It is easy to blame war, and oppression, on foreign and Israeli machinations but in the rest of the globe former colonies and oppressed nations have become more democratic and liberal (like in East Asia) rather than succumb to the vicious cycle of warfare in the Middle East.

So what are the death tolls of these indigenous wars and conflicts? Regarding the more bloody contests there was probably at least 400,000 deaths for the “Iran-Iraq War,” 400,000 in Syria’s Civil War so far, 150,000 in the “Lebanese Civil War,” 100,000 in Algeria’s last civil war, at arguably 250,000 killed between Kurds fighting the Turks and Iraqis, while the North Civil War in Yemen cost at least 100,000. This produces an astounded 1,400,000 deaths in these conflicts at least considering many of these estimates are on the lower side put forth by various sources. Of course while these are the worst cases there are far more indigenous conflicts such as the “Egyptian-Libyan War,” Libya’s multiple wars against Chad, the brief war between Jordan and Syria, the “Jordanian Civil War,” multiple civil wars in Afghanistan and Yemen, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist campaigns across the region. If we added the deaths from these conflicts as well the death toll would be notably higher.

Yet at 1,400,000 deaths the number is staggering enough. It is nearly ten times the amount of those estimated killed in Israel’s wars and conflicts, more than two or three times the amount of those killed in American-led wars in the region, one million more than the French killed in her few conflicts, and perhaps 100 times as many killed by Britain’s fading colonial wars. Only Russia with at least 1 million killed in Afghanistan, and tens of thousands killed in Chechnya, is close to matching how many people were killed by Arabs, and Muslims, in the Middle East since 1945.

What do these death tolls suggest? Firstly, Arab and Muslim groups, and nations, have killed more people, especially each other, than either America, Israel, Britain or France and even Russia. This should be qualified again because this not only includes the perhaps 1,400,000 killed in inter-Arab, Muslim conflict but a huge percentage in other wars that involve foreign states and Israel. Shiites and Sunnis arguably killed more of each other in Iraq than America during the war in 2003-11, Algerians may have killed more of each other in the “Algerian War” than the French (especially if we consider the fate of France’s Harkis Algerian allies at the end of the conflict), while Arabs, especially the Jordanians and Syrians, killed thousands of Palestinians, and the Palestinian groups themselves have killed thousands of each other rather than firmly unite against Israel.

All of this quashes the idea the the Arab nations and Muslim groups in the region are purely victims of outside, or Israeli influence and war, or that they themselves are inherently peaceful and just want to be left alone. It also questions the idea that their main enemies are America, and Israel, for according to the number of wars they have fought amongst themselves, as well as the lopsided death tolls, the main enemy of Arab and Muslim factions in the Middle East seem to be themselves.

The death tolls also tell us that Israel, despite being the most criticized country in, and outside, the region for conflict in the Middle East, has actually killed the least amount of people (with the exception of Britain). All other foreigner nations, and especially the Arabs, have killed exceedingly more people and Muslims than Israel. American wars in the region would not be prohibitively bloody were in not for the “Iraq War” (which has killed much more than half of all those killed in her wars in the region) but even here the Arabs have probably killed more or each other than America. France had her one very bloody war in Algeria with 300,000 dead and the much less costly joint “Suez Crisis” with Britain, but despite the terrible conduct of French forces in Algeria France’s reputation, and influence, in the region is relatively healthy. Britain gets perhaps less censure in the region than Israel, and America, yet her colonial past, and recent support of American ventures in the region has not done her many favours either. Yet Israel, Britain, France and America have all killed less Arabs, and Muslims, than the Russia has. However, Russia is not nearly as criticized, censured or demonized as much as any of the former, especially Israel and America.

Besides death tolls there has been many refugee crises in the region since 1945. Unsurprisingly the most commonly known is the “Palestinian refugee crisis.” During the “First Arab-Israeli War” perhaps 700,000 Palestinians were kicked out, or fled, from territory which became Israel and went to the West Bank, the Gaza Strip or other Arab countries. This was made worse in 1967 when Israel defeated Egypt and Jordan, conquered the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and a further 300,000 Palestinians fled again, mostly to Jordan or other Arab countries. Few of these Palestinians were allowed to return and today there is probably 5 million Palestinian refugees if we include descendants of the original refugees from 1948. Today most of these live in poverty in overcrowded refugee camps in neighbouring Arab countries who have rarely tried to integrate them into their societies. Meanwhile countless Palestinians live in terrible conditions in the Israeli de facto occupied West Bank, or under Hamas in the tiny Gaza Strip that is under Israeli blockade and enjoys a poor standing of living.

The Palestinians also had poor luck when the PLO was driven from Jordan after the massacre of “Black September” and then later from Lebanon after Israel’s invasion in 1982. Even little Kuwait was ruthless when after the “Gulf War” she expelled 200,000 Palestinians from the Kingdom, partially out of revenge for the PLO supporting Saddam Hussein. Omar Gaddafi also expelled thousands of Palestinians from Libya in the mid-1990s in reaction to the Oslo Accords.

While everyone knows of the poor, hapless Palestinian refugees few today remember the at least 800,000 Jews who were expelled from Arab countries after the 1948 conflict. This number was higher than the 700,000 Palestinians who were expelled from Israel during this conflict but ironically it actually benefited Israel since she integrated these refugees successfully to make the country stronger. This is in stark contrast to the marginalized Palestinian refugees in Arab countries who are generally poor, enjoy few rights and are cramped into refugee camps even after nearly seven decades.

Another little known refugee crisis involved the European settler community in Algeria in the 1960s; the so called “Pied Noires” who not only had enjoyed more rights, and privileges, than the majority Arab population but generally maltreated and dismissed the latter as well. After the French withdrew from Algeria in lieu of her failed colonial war most of the Pied Noires, perhaps 800,000, fled to France in 1962 with most of the remainder fleeing in later years.

Several million Kurds have become refugees in Europe, and middle eastern countries, thanks to several wars waged by Iraq and Turkey versus Kurdish movements. There are also several hundred thousands of Chechen refugees and while this may seem low compared to other cases it should be noted that this is proportionally devastating considering Chechnya’s population is not much over 1 million today.

For decades Afghanistan had the worst refugee crisis in the world, with up to 6 million during the “Soviet-Afghan War.” After the fall of the Taliban the majority of these returned home but with rising violence in the new American war in Afghanistan there are now probably at least 3 million Afghan refugees.

Israel’s wars in Lebanon have produced many refugees, though most of them are temporary refugees who return home considering most of Israel’s actions were aerial campaigns, or in one case a limited raid. However, many Lebanese would find little solace in this as they have had to flee their homes no less than five times as seen by Israel’s Litani raid in 1978, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the aerial campaigns against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 1993 and 1996 and the 34 day “Second Lebanon War” in 2006. As for figures the Litani operation resulted in at least 100,000 refugees, arguably 300,000 in 1993, a similar number or more in 1996, while it has been suggested perhaps 1 million Lebanese, and even several hundred thousands Israelis, were temporarily displaced by the “Second Lebanon War.” Of course this does not even cover the refugees made by Lebanon’s Civil War or Syria’s subsequent involvement in it. Either way, like Chechnya, the numbers are disproportionate as Lebanon’s population was only 4 million in 2006.

America’s war in Iraq caused millions of refugees. While some of this can be blamed on Sunni-Shiite animosity, Al-Qaeda provocations and excesses, as well as Syrian, Iranian, and even Saudi, support for insurgent, and terrorist groups, in Iraq, America must shoulder much of the blame considering many of her war policies were naive and flawed, and none of this would have happened had she not invaded Iraq. As such perhaps 4 million Iraqis became refugees in their own country, or other ones, during the conflict from 2003-2011. Many hoped that after General Petraeus’s successful counterinsurgency strategy in 2007, and the relative peace and cooperation between Sunnis and Shiites in the next few years, would solve the conflict and help the refugee crisis. However, after the American army withdrew the Shiite dominating government in Iraq succumbed to old habits, oppressed the Sunnis, and thus helped create ISIS, further war and more refugees. Several scholars have suggested that Iraq, by being the Arab country that has the proper mix of sufficient people, oil and water should be leading the Arab World but history has not been kind to her.

Finally, we have the current “Syrian Civil War” which has produced a refugee crisis that has surpassed even Afghanistan at her worst. There are perhaps 10 million Syrian refugees, either internally displaced or currently living in Arab countries, Europe and elsewhere, and this represents close to 50% of Syria’s prewar population! This war cannot be blamed on American machinations, or Israeli aggression. Syria is one of the few Arab states in the region that is not an American client and Israel has generally left Syria alone since 1973 despite the fact the latter has supported every resistance, and terrorist, group against her and arguably sabotaged peace between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and the Palestinians. Henry Kissinger once said “you can’t make war in the Middle East without Egypt and you can’t make peace without Syria.”

Rather President Assad of Syria, and his Alawite, Christian and other minority allies in Syria brought the conflict on themselves by marginalizing the larger Sunni population of Syria, by being even more autocratic, backwards and repressive than most Arab states, and by playing with fire by supporting Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and other fanatical Islamic groups, against American forces and the Iraqis. For these hard core Islamic groups could hardly be considered bedfellows for Assad’s secular regime in Syria which has routinely imprisoned and repressed Islamic groups.

Unsurprisingly these militant factions, especially ISIS, found it easy to piggyback on the legitimate demands made by Syrian protesters in lieu of the “Arab Spring” and eventually found a key role in the resistance after Assad’s predictable crackdown. Either way great power rivalry, along with regional powers interest in the country, the fact that Europe, the UN, and other entities do not want to address the conflict head on, means this conflict will probably drag on for years without end or a satisfactory conclusion.

What can we make of these refugee statistics? Jews in the region were effected just as badly as the Palestinians in 1948-49 at first and there is little recognition of this or the fact that the expulsion of Jews from Arab countries even happened in much of the world. However, the Palestinians have been poorly treated by not only the Israelis who hurt them in 1948, 1967 and even 1982, but by their supposed Arab friends as well who expelled them in 1970 from Jordan, Kuwait after 1991, and even from Libya after the Oslo accords. We should also remember that Israel successfully helped, and integrated, the Jewish refugees after 1948, although admittedly were not so kind to Palestinians under their occupation, whereas the Arab states in all cases kept the Palestinians poor, disenfranchised, and usually in refugee camps to use as political pawns in their real, or fictitious, battles between Israel, America and amongst themselves.

We should also note that the fate of the Pied Noires in Algeria, the Kurds against Turkey and Iraq, and the Chechen refugees have generally been ignored and forgotten versus other conflicts and people. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the “Algerian War” was along time ago and its consequences were limited, that the Kurds did not have the media savvy of the Palestinians or were not as important to major states as Turkey, or sometimes Iraq, or that no one really cared about Russia crushing a former republic that no one knew about. Maybe it was because none of these conflicts involved Israel or America, the usual suspects of blame, or maybe the conflicts themselves had less geopolitical relevance than others in the region, who knows.

Sadly even the aerial campaigns Israel unleashed against Lebanon, which generally resulted in temporary, versus permanent, refugees and killed a fraction of people versus other refugee crises, are by contrast well known, often broached and vehemently condemned (with some justification).

Finally, the numerous conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan have by far produced the worst refugee crises, at least by numbers. In Iraq and Afghanistan much of this can be blamed on Russians and Americans, although it should be noted that both Iraq and Afghanistan had plenty of issues regarding refugees before American interventions in 2001 and 2003. As for Syria the refugee issue is all but the Assad’s regime fault.

By now it should be obvious that nothing in the Middle East, especially war and terrorism, is simple. Americans, and Israelis, are not simple victims of terrorism who have never provoked conflict. Arab States, and Muslim groups, are not innocent actors who have never started wars against others. Russia is not a neutral state with no blood on her hands, and France and Britain had their colonial wars but have been mostly absent from conflict in the region for the past few decades. All of these entities have started wars and conflicts, backed shady groups, killed civilians, produced refugees, and subverted democratic, and liberal movements, to further their own selfish national, or substate, goals. No factions in the Middle East, foreign or domestic, are innocent.

Having said that there are unequivocal trends in the region, which are often forgotten and ignored, as well as countless myths that are perpetrated which do more harm than good. For one thing Arab, and Muslim groups, have killed more of each other than have been killed by Israelis and foreigners. They have also caused more refugees than the latter as well. Whatever wrongs Israel, and foreign countries, have done to Arabs and Muslims, and there are many, there are clearly many problems the Arab and Muslim groups in the region have to address among themselves.

Regarding conventional wars foreign, and Israeli, arms have always triumphed against Arab and Muslim ones (though Jordan fought Israel to a stalemate in 1948 and Egypt had notable victories in 1973). Meanwhile aerial campaigns have produced mixed results; most military goals failing, but sometimes producing political goals in spite of this (aerial power has been more successful when backed by guerrillas or soldiers on the ground). Either way the allure of airpower to policymakers in Israel, and the West, is an illusionary one; it cannot occupy territory, effectively stop rocket attacks, coerce enemies to change policies, let alone defeat armies and insurgents, on its own.

On the other side despite Israeli shortsightedness in policy, American naiveness, and the decadence and incompetence of Arab regimes, the vast majority of insurgent, and terrorist, movements in the region fail, usually decisively (the colonial wars being notable exceptions). Against Chechen rebel victory in the mid-1990s, the collapse of the Soviet client state in Afghanistan during the same period, the PLO’s temporary victory via the OSLO accords, and the Chadian resistance groups against Libya there are dozens, arguably more than a hundred, of examples of failures like all Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda campaigns, most Palestinian and Kurdish efforts, Shiite and Sunni militias in Iraq, ISIS, etc.

However, between outright victories and defeats there are too many instances in the region when the result is not clear cut, or the defeated party can claim victory (or avoiding defeat) due to propaganda or merely surviving. In the case of insurgencies this is less the case because most of them have been brutally suppressed but when we remember that most wars in the region have not led to the overthrow of countries and regimes this makes more sense. None of the “Arab-Israeli Wars” toppled another regime, no aerial campaign broke the enemy side, and American, and foreign, won battles have not resulted in their political goals being realized as much as they would like. As such Nasser, King Hussein and Assad survived Israel’s wars, Hamas, Hezbollah and Saddam survived bombing campaigns, and Arab insurgents have often survived the worst Britain, France, and America, and sometimes Russia, have thrown against them because political, or other circumstances, have intervened.

Finally, we can look at long term goals of the participants, which should be a good gauge considering most wars in the region are limited, and due to the fact that so many of the conflicts are continuations of previous ones. The colonial powers (Britain and France) lost their struggle to dominate their colonies and control the fate of the Middle East without question. Russia failed to uphold her proxy in Afghanistan, ultimately succeeded in reconquering Chechnya, and has hurt America in Syria, yet has never regained the power, and influence, in the region she used to enjoy (having many powers and resistance groups threatening Israel, America and western powers) and if Syria collapsed Russian influence in the region would be marginal. Russia only has Syria as a client state in the region while America has dozens.

While America has been hurt, economically and diplomatically, in the region her long term goals have held: Most Arab states are her clients, Israel is safe, the access to oil fields are open to her, and her friends, and terrorism against America is extremely limited. Israel, who has won most battles, not so many wars, and frankly sucks at winning international opinion, has generally secured her goals as well: Survival, peace or relative peace, few casualties or disruption to her society, etc. Israel has secured herself against conventional threats from her neighbours, and neutralized threats against resistance groups from Gaza and the West Bank. However, Israel still faces a potential long term nuclear threat from Iran, and a direct threat from Hezbollah, who has at least 100,000 rockets in Lebanon. Thus Israel is either the most secure she has ever been, or approaching the most turbulent time in her history.

As for Arab States, Iran, or irregular groups the future is uncertain. Despite the naiveness that outsiders regarded the “Arab Spring” the despots, princes and other leaders in Arab regimes and Iran have held onto power. Resistance groups like ISIS, who are at war with everyone, and other ones that have alienated too many Arabs or enjoy little foreign backing, will probably be crushed or marginalized. Others like Hamas and Hezbollah, who enjoy local, and foreign, backing will probably be around for a long time. Even militia groups like the Sunni, and Shiite, ones in Iraq will not go away so long as Iraq remains a fractured, corrupt, and sectarian divided state. Iran has done a very good job at staying out of wars, while fomenting wars and terrorism abroad, and it is unlikely American, and Israeli, pressure or sanctions will stop her from eventually acquiring nuclear weapons. However, it is anyone’s guess if the theocratic regime in Tehran can remain in power indefinitely given the growing split between those who support the Mullahs and those who want reform and democracy.

Finally, the Arab regimes are often terrible at war, and cannot seem to reform or really build a future for their peoples, but they are remarkably good at staying in power. Tools such as controlling the media, fomenting violence against external threats, blaming every issues on America, Israel or the West, and suggesting that real democracy will only bring violent Islamic zealots to power are but a few of those utilized by Arab regimes to prolong their rotten rule. Besides which America, the West, and often Israel, generally back most of these regimes, openly or tactically, reluctantly or enthusiastically, for a variety of reasons; some of them pragmatic, some naive, and even some that do not make the slightest sense.

One thing is certain. As long as the Middle East is full of backwards nations, fanatical terrorist groups and oil, and as long as America, the West, and Israel care more about their short term interests than helping the Arabs and Muslims help themselves reform politically, culturally and economically, there will be no shortage of conflicts. While it is hard to see the next seventy years being as bloody as the previous seventy it is not impossible.

Bibliography

Alexander, Martin and J Keiger. France and the Algerian War: Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002.

Beckett, Ian. Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and their opponents since 1750. New York: Routledge, 2005.

Boot, Max. Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present. New York: Liveright Publishing, 2013.

Boyne, Walter.  The Two O’Clock War.  New York:  Thomas Dunne Books, 2002.

Bregman, Ahron.  Israel’s Wars:  A History since 1947.  London:  Routledge, 2002.

DiMarco, Louis. Concrete Hell: Urban Warfare from Stalingrad to Iraq. Oxford: Osprey, 2012.

Eilam, Ehud. Israel’s Way of War: A Strategic and Operational Analysis,1948-2014. Jefferson: McFarland and Company, 2016.

Galeotti, Mark. Russia’s Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009. Oxford: Osprey, 2014.

Harel, Amos and Avi Issacharoff.  34 Days:  Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon.  New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Herzog, Chaim.  The Arab-Israeli Wars:  War and Peace in the Middle East.  London:  Green Hill Books, 2005.

Jaco, Charles. The Gulf War. Indianapolis: Alpha Books, 2002.

Keegan, John. The Iraq War. Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2004.

Lewis, Bernard. The Crisis of Islam. Holy War and Unholy Terror. Toronto: Random House, 2004.

Lewis, Bernard. What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East. New York: HarperCollins, 2003.

National Geographic Atlas of the Middle East. Washington D.C: 2003.

Oren, Michael.  Six Days of War:  June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East.  New York:  Ballantine Books, 2003.

Pollack, Kenneth. Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002.

Ross, Stewart.  The Middle East since 1945.  London:  Teach Yourself, 2004.

Rubin, Barry. Conflict and Insurgency in the Contemporary Middle East. New York: Routledge, 2009.

Rubin, Barry.  The Truth About Syria.  New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Shlaim, Avi. War and Peace in the Middle East. New York: Penguin Books, 1995.

Van Creveld, Martin. The Age of Airpower. New York: Public Affairs, 2011.
Windrow, Martin. The Algerian War 1954-62. Oxford: Osprey, 2005.

Wikipedia.


Share article on