Why Syria is the Greatest Obstacle to Peace in the Middle East

Whenever something terrible happens in the Middle East, which is often, people in the region, as well as in West, look for someone to blame.  At the top of the list is usually the United States, for its support of Israel and despotic nations in the region (not to mention Iraq), or Israel, for its treatment of the Palestinians.  Meanwhile the Muslim countries themselves usually escape censor, despite the fact that their corrupt regimes, rife with economic stagnation and anti-Semitic and anti-western media have done nothing to help their people but much to hurt any chance of peace.  Even Iran with its history of terrorism and subversion against fellow Muslim nations, or Saudi Arabia with its significant funding of terrorist activities, inevitably seem to avoid serious scrutiny.

However one could argue that Syria, more than Iran and Saudi Arabia, and much more than Israel and the United States, is the biggest obstacle to peace in the region.

Syria is the only country in the Middle East that has been consistently at odds with any attempt to establish a lasting peace in the region.  Israel has given up land and offered concessions to make peace with several countries.  Egypt and Jordan have both signed peace treaties with Israel.  Lebanon, with the exception of Hezbollah, has a live and let live attitude towards Israel and the west.  Iran was virtually an Israeli ally until the fall of the Shah.  Most of the other Muslim countries tacitly recognize Israel and work with the west.  Once implacable terrorist elements such as the P.L.O. have made serious efforts towards peace.

Even Libya and Iraq have better track records than Syria.  Libya was relatively neutral until Gadhafi came to power, and even though he is now on the brink of overthrow, he at least gave up his weapons of mass destructions, and paid compensation to terrorist victims after the invasion of Iraq briefly “encouraged” him to reach an accommodation with the international community.  As for Iraq, its status as a rogue state has been replaced by a nascent democracy.

Yet Syria has never made a notable, or sincere, effort towards peace, let alone granting its own people freedom, or improving the lives of the Palestinians.  Even its presence at the Madrid Peace Conference and the Oslo Accords, both of which failed to bring the Syrians any closer to peace, was likely the result of American hegemony and Syrian isolation after the collapse of The Soviet Union, its historical protector.

This is unfortunate because Syrian engagement, or at least Syrian neutrality, is a precondition for peace in the region.  Henry Kissinger once said “you can’t make war in the Middle East without Egypt and you can’t make peace without Syria.”  This is true because while the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty has left Israel with a distinct military advantage against her potential enemies, Syrian intransigence has upset any serious initiative to guarantee a lasting peace.

How can this be the case?  Arguably, the greatest block to reconciliation between the Muslim world on one hand and Israel and the West on the other is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  The theory is that if this conflict were resolved the Muslim world would lose most of its anger and distrust towards Israel and the Western world.  Another theory is that it is the authoritarian nature of the majority of the Muslim states, rather than the conflict per se, that is the real cause of the divide between East and West.  Either way, the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would be beneficial because not only would it do much to win over the Muslim worlds’ hearts and minds, but it would also eliminate much of the legitimacy of the authoritarian regimes because of their reliance on anti-Semitic and anti-Western sentiment.

However, to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict requires two preconditions:  American pressure on Israel and Arab pressure on Palestinian and other terrorist organizations.

While America is usually seen as unquestionably pro-Israel, there are several precedents where it has reined the Israelis in.  After 1956 it was American pressure that forced the Israelis to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula.  In 1973 the Americans told Golda Meir not to pre-empt the Arab attack on Yom Kippur.  During the Lebanon war in 1982 Ronald Reagan, arguably the most pro-Israeli President in American history, forced the Israelis to stop shelling Beirut at the height of their attack.  And after the Gulf War America dragged the Israelis to the Oslo Accords by threatening to withhold significant subsidies.  It could be argued that Presidents Bush and Obama have not been as strict as they could have been with Israel, but undoubtedly America has the means to do so if necessary.

Meanwhile any attempt to rein in terrorism against Israel is vain without Syrian involvement.  Even though some pundits would say that states in the region are impotent to do much to clamp down on terrorism, the evidence would suggest otherwise.  Nasser prevented any serious attacks being launched on Israel from the Gaza strip after 1956 to avoid provoking Israel.  Likewise, King Hussein crushed the P.L.O. when it tried to overthrow him in 1970 and the Syrians willingly killed 10,000 civilians to crush the Muslim Brotherhood when it staged a revolt in Hama in 1982.  Similar actions, subtle or brutal, have been used by other countries to rein in the Palestinians or terrorist organizations whenever it is in their interests to do so.

The two major terrorist elements that are the greatest obstacles to peace with Israel are Hamas and Hezbollah, while the P.L.O. has now become a moderating force.  These two organizations are currently unwilling to recognize, let alone negotiate with, Israel and are dedicated to “liberating” Palestine by force.  The same used to be the case with the P.L.O. until after the Gulf War it lost most of its support from the Soviet Union and Iraq and was forced to enter into negotiations.  It is hopeful, though not certain, that a similar weakening of Hamas and Hezbollah would lead towards the same result.

While Egypt and Jordan have done much to restrain the activities and capabilities of these two organizations, Syria, Lebanon and the P.L.O. have not.  The P.L.O. is too weak and Hezbollah controls much of Lebanon, even having its own members of Parliament in the government.  However, Syria is the key to facilitating terrorism against Israel.  While Iran is seen as the major instigator of terrorism in region, especially regarding the funding and training of Hezbollah, Syria provides the crucial bridge between a far away Iran and the terrorist groups opposed to Israel.

Hezbollah may have been created by Iran, but it needs Syria to survive.  The Lebanese army cannot move against Hezbollah because despite the fact the Syrian army recently left the country, Lebanon is still a de-facto vassal state of Syria.  Up to a million Syrians work in Lebanon (a country with a population barely over four million), the Syrian elite controls much of the economy and Syria’s intelligence services exercise wide control.

Israel has little hope of crushing Hezbollah alone because of its reluctance to re-invade southern Lebanon after its previously failed occupation and even if it tried it would be pointless as long as Syria continued to supply Hezbollah.  However, if Syria came to an accommodation with Israel and actively restrained, or at least discontinued to support Hezbollah, Israel and Lebanon would likely be able to weaken the terrorist organization to the point it would be forced to negotiate.

Hamas is not as strong as Hezbollah and does not have the geographic advantage of being close to Syria or Iran.  However, it still gets roughly 90% of its funding from “undisclosed” foreign aid, much of which is from those two countries.  Once again, if Syria stopped its support of Hamas, it would be a big blow to the organization, and if Hezbollah was weakened to the point where it had to negotiate, Hamas would be pursued ruthlessly by an Israel no longer concerned about Syria or Hezbollah.

Iran would still try to influence events from afar, but would be at a significant disadvantage after losing its main ally in the region.  The fact that most Arab countries are increasingly seeing a Nuclear Iran as a bigger threat than Israel does not help it either.

Yet the question remains as to why Syria, unlike Egypt and Jordan who have made peace with the Israelis and most other Muslim countries who at least tacitly recognize Israel, refuses to do so.  This is not a simple question to answer, as there are many factors at work.  However, the main reasons seem to include a combination of political necessity and Syrian pride.

Like most regimes in the region the Syrian government has the used the so called Jewish and American threats as justification for their corrupt and repressive rule.  One reason that Egypt (at least until recently) and Jordan were able to make peace with Israel is because of their inherent stability; Egypt is the strongest Arab country, and Jordan’s monarchy is extremely respected by its people.  Yet other regimes like Syria may believe, rightly or wrongly, that their governments would not survive a peace treaty with Israel.  This is the consequence of their hate spewing media machines that encourage their people to blame foreign elements rather than the government.

Even though this scenario is common to most countries in the region, it is particularly true of Syria.  Having been Israel’s most implacable enemy since 1948 it would be hard for Syria to change sides even if it wanted to.  Syria’s high status among nations in the region is the result of its long-standing opposition to Israel.  Compared to more populous countries like Egypt and Iran, oil-rich countries like Saudi Arabia and Iraq and militarily impressive nations like Israel and Turkey, Syria is a relatively medium sized country with few people, small oil reserves and a backwards army.  In other words, without its support of terrorism against Israel, Syria would be just another relatively unimportant country in the region.

While it is true that an accommodation with Israel and the West would allow Syria to regain the Golan Heights, this small consolation would not be enough to compensate for Syria’s special place in the Middle East.  Other such advantages of making peace would include ending sanctions against Syria and other economic perks that would boost the economy and improve the standard of living for the Syrian people.  However it is likely the Syrian elite, being dependent upon its Alawi minority for power would be sceptical about improving the lot of the Sunni majority who could begin to challenge them if such a situation developed.  Even if that was not a concern, the Syrian Ba’athist elite who control the country, and who already enjoy the trappings of wealth, would probably still prefer Syria’s special role of opposing Israel to enriching its own people.

Put simply the Syrian political elite have much to lose, and little to gain, by coming to an accommodation with Israel and the West.

There are few options to effectively deal with Syria and most of them are not encouraging.  A regime change initiated by the Israelis, the Turks, or the Americans would be bloody and likely to fail given international and especially Middle Eastern opinion.  A popular revolt as seen in Tunisia and Egypt is also unrealistic.  Such a situation would more likely resemble the current chaos in Libya, although probably on a more violent scale like Syria’s massacre of its own people in Hama in 1982.  Being even less dependent upon the West and more secure than Libya, Syria’s regime would likely survive such a revolt.

The chance of a more enlightened successor to Bashar al-Assad, the President of Syria is likewise improbable.  Considering people thought Bashar would be a reformer when he succeeded his father and the huge benefits and perks the regime gives its supporters in order to survive, it is probable the next leader of Syria will be just as likely to oppose any thoughts of peace.

It is probable that the collapse of the theocratic regime in Tehran would do much to isolate Syria, just as an accommodation between Israel and Syria would isolate Hezbollah and Hamas.  However this is an unlikely occurrence.

Arguably the best strategy to deal with Syria would be to expose the myth of its benign role in the Middle East.  If Syria was seen as a rogue state that has constantly manipulated its neighbours and betrayed the Palestinians, rather than being seen as the country that has relentlessly fought the Israelis and stood up for the Palestinians it would lose much credibility and influence.  Such a media offensive would be difficult in the Muslim world, given the control of information, but similar offensives worked well against the Soviet Union.  Perhaps more grassroots methods like twitter and facebook would have to be combined with more shotgun methods like newspapers, T.V. and radio.  Additionally much effort would be needed to convince the Western world of the Syrian threat, as western public opinion tends to be more critical of a democratic Israel than repressive Arab dictatorships.

Either way such an offensive would have to focus on destroying Syria’s credibility as a positive influence in the region.  Exposing Syria’s long history of manipulating its neighbours, its brutal conduct towards its own people and the Palestinians, and its incompetence at fighting the Israelis would be a good place to start.

Bordering nations often have turbulent relationships but Syria in particular is a very bad neighbour.  While Syria’s actions against Israel and her rape of Lebanon are well known, its conduct towards Jordan, Turkey and Iraq are less so.  Before the Six Day War Syria launched Palestinian terrorist attacks through Jordan to escape Israel’s wrath.  Syria also backed Palestinian efforts to overthrow Jordan’s monarchy and actually sent an army to aid the P.L.O. against King Hussein during the brief civil war in 1970.

Even more incredible given its weakness compared to Turkey was Syrian support for the Kurdish rebels fighting the Turkish army.  Syria only stopped aiding the rebels when Turkey made obvious preparations to invade Syria.  It would seem that force is one of the few ways to motivate the Syrian leadership.  Even Iraq, which until recently was a fellow Ba’athist country, has not escaped Syrian manipulation.  During the Iran-Iraq War Syria was the only country in the region that backed Iran over Iraq.  Syria also joined the Coalition effort during the Gulf War to liberate Kuwait from Iraq.  Finally Syria was instrumental, at least at first, in nurturing the Sunni insurgency in Iraq after the American invasion in 2003.

Syria’s treatment of its own people is no better.  Although its population is mostly Sunni the regime maintains power by propping up its Alawi minority at the expense of the Sunnis and other groups.  Just like in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq where the Sunni minority received preferential treatment in jobs, education, and business, the Alawi in Syria are granted similar perks.  Syria’s intelligence forces are also known for their cruelty and are exceedingly numerous at around 50,000 personnel.  For a country of around 22,000,000 people that is an alarming number indeed.  As for what the Syrian regime is willing to do to stay in power the previously mentioned example of the massacre of 10,000 civilians to defeat the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama during 1982 is a chilling example.  Gadafi’s attempt to defeat the current rebellion in Libya seems almost timid in comparison.

Yet Syria’s treatment of the Palestinians is perhaps the most shocking realization given how Syria props itself up as a champion for their cause.  During Israel’s war of independence in 1948-49 approximately 80,000 Palestinian refugees fled to Syria.  Rather than trying to negotiate with Israel for their return, or at least try to incorporate them into Syrian society, Syria dispersed them into far flung refugee camps and has used them as political pawns for the last sixty years.  This is all the more absurd considering they could have used many of the Palestinians to compensate for Syria’s severe shortage of agricultural workers at the time.  Apparently political convenience was more important to the Syrian leadership than economic or humanitarian concerns.

This is the same strategy Syria has used in Lebanon.  Rather than try to improve the lives of the Palestinians in Lebanon it has used them as pawns for their political games against Israel.  Ironically the Syrians were invited into Lebanon by the Christian Maronite community to help them fight the P.L.O.  However Syria took advantage of the situation to turn Lebanon into a vassal state and has had no scruples in switching allegiances from the Christians, to the P.L.O. to Hezbollah whenever it has suited their interests.

Syria’s relationship with the P.L.O. has been complicated to say the least, arresting Arafat in 1966, and then supporting him against Jordan until the P.L.O. was banished to Lebanon, then fighting with the Maronites against Arafat in Lebanon, and then later fighting with Arafat against the Maronites and the Israelis.  Talk about treason being a matter of dates!

Two notable events occurred in 1976 when Syria’s intervention on the side of the Maronites in the Lebanese Civil War facilitated the massacres in the Karantina district of Beirut and the Tel al Zaatar refugee camp that resulted in the deaths of 2,000 Palestinians and other minorities.  While every critic of Israel knows that the Israeli Defence Forces stood idly by while the Maronites massacred Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon in 1982 it is doubtful even a small percentage of them know about similar Syrian actions.

Finally there is the myth that while other countries like Egypt and Jordan have given up the fight against Israel, Syria has consistently fought the Israelis from the beginning.  In reality Syria has been bested by Israel virtually every single time.  In the Israeli war of independence the Syrian Army, along with the rest of the Arab armies, failed to destroy Israel’s poorly equipped army that had been previously weakened by fighting the British Army.  Syria also stood by while the Israelis routed the Egyptian Army during the Suez crisis in 1956.

During the Six Day War, which Syria did much to provoke, the Syrian army sat on the Golan Heights while the Egyptian and Jordanian Armies were pummelled by the I.D.F, which then proceeded to conquer the Golan Heights after the Syrians put up feeble resistance.  In the Yom Kippur War where the Egyptians and Syrians launched a surprise attack against Israel three powerful Syrian armoured divisions were unable to destroy two Israeli Brigades on the Golan Heights.  For every tank the Israelis lost fighting on the Golan Heights the Syrians lost ten and the I.D.F. quickly recovered from the initial shock and pushed the Syrians back to Damascus.

When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 they destroyed Syria’s considerable surface to air missile battery presence in Eastern Lebanon and shot down nearly 100 Syrian fighters within days without losing a single plane of their own.  Israeli air supremacy is so dominant that they easily destroyed the nuclear facility in North East Syria in 2007 without opposition and Israelis warplanes have been known to buzz the Syrian Presidential Palace with impunity.

Even at sea the Syrians have failed miserably, as seen by the one-way battle of Latakia in 1973 where six Israeli ships sank five Syrian vessels without loss.  There is a reason the Syrians use terrorist proxies to fight Israel; they are simply incapable of fighting the Israelis themselves.  Yet even these terrorist proxies are not as effective as some believe.  While they have certainly have done much to muffle the Palestinian moderates and hurt the peace process, they have done relatively little damage to Israel itself.  Hezbollah’s price for killing a handful of Israeli civilians during the Lebanon war in 2006 was more than a 1000 Lebanese civilians killed in collateral damage and significant damage to Southern Lebanon.  The result was the same for Hamas during the brief Gaza war in 2009.  Needless to say the Syrian army stood on the sidelines during both conflicts.  While Hezbollah and Hamas claimed victory in their respective conflicts, they have been notably docile since.

Some would say that Israel’s success is mostly because of American military aid.  That is undoubtedly a factor, but hardly decisive.  Israeli received hardly any military aid from the Americans until after the Six Day War, arguably Israel’s most impressive military achievement.  Also, any aid given to the Israelis was matched by Russian aid given to Syria, and contrary to popular perception, much of the equipment was first rate (Egypt’s competent performance during the Yom Kippur war bears this out).  Likewise significant American military aid to Jordan, Saudi Arabia and later Egypt have not been enough to make their armies first-rate.

Israel’s real advantages come from their superior leadership, training, doctrine, and intelligence.  Two comparisons are telling.  During the Six Day War the Israeli turn around rate for their planes (how much time it takes for a plane to land, refuel, rearm and take off again) was 8 minutes vs. 8 hours for the Egyptians!  Also during the Arab-Israeli wars the Israelis managed to shoot down more than 600 Arab planes in aerial combat while losing around 20 of its own; this is a ratio of 30 to 1.  The planes the Israelis shot down were generally not obsolete, but the best the Soviet Union had to offer.

Syria is the greatest obstacle to peace in the Middle East.  It is the only country that has never made a serious effort to recognize Israel or make any accommodation with the west.  Syria will continue to be an obstacle as long as it controls Lebanon, supports Hezbollah and Hamas, and acts as a bridge between these two organizations and Iran. The Syrian regime has little interest in making peace because the status it receives by continuing its opposition to Israel outweighs any benefits that regaining the Golan Heights or making peace with the Israelis have to offer the Syrian elite.  The prospect of regime change, the possibility of a more enlightened successor to Bashar al-Assad, and the potential collapse of Iran are all unlikely means to motivate the Syrians to make peace.  The best chance of dealing with Syria would be to expose the myth of its benign role in the region.  This would have to be done both in the Western world, where public opinion tends to be against a democratic Israel rather than repressive Arab dictatorships, and the Middle East itself.  The focus of such a media offensive would be Syria’s constant manipulation of its neighbours, its poor treatment of the Palestinians and its own population, and its history of incompetence when fighting the Israelis.

The Syrian regime relies on disinformation to survive.  The same was true of the former Soviet Union.  As people who believed in Communism learned the brutal truth of the communist experiment they started deserting the Soviets en masse.  This eventually infected the heart of Russia itself and the Soviet Union imploded.  In order to have a serious chance of making peace in the region we have to convince the Western and the Arab World, as well as the Syrian people itself, that the Syrian regime is the greatest obstacle to achieve it.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
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